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31 August 1982

EAST EUROPE REPORT
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GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC

POLITICAL ANALYST DISCUSSES WESTERN SOCIALIST STANCE ON PEACE

West German Commentary

Bonn IWE-TAGESDIENST in German No 95, 25 Jun 82 p 2

[Report from Berlin: "Criticism of Socialist International's Stance on Disarmament." A translation of the East Berlin IPW-BERICHTE article cited below follows this commentary]

[Text] The IPW-BERICHTE [IPW Reports] (No 6, 1982), which are published by the Institute for International Politics and Economics (IPW), criticized the Socialist International's (SI) stance on disarmament and detente, calling it contradictory. The BERICHTE stated that in regard to "NATO's intensive armament policy and the confrontation policy pursued by the United States" there were "serious differences of opinion" both among the parties of the SI and within the SI itself and that the political activities within and vis-a-vis the peace movement were quite inconsistent. According to the BERICHTE, the SPD obviously has lost much of its former prestige as vanguard of the policy of detente. The journal conceded that many of the views of the social-democratic parties agreed with those of the socialist countries, e.g. the view regarding various steps to be taken toward disarmament; but it argued that on account of their equating the United States and the USSR as superpowers many Social Democrats were unable to perceive the "real culprits" behind the arms race and the threat of war.

GDR Political Analyst's Critique

East Berlin IPW-BERICHTE in German Vol 11 No 6, Jun 82 pp 10-16

['Analyses--Problems' feature article by Horst Dietzel: "The Stance of the Socialist International (SI) on Peace and Disarmament: A Significant Factor in the Argument About War and Peace--Common Points and Differences in the SI--Growing Activities in the Struggle Against US's Intensive Armament Policy"]

[Text] At the beginning of the 1980's, the parties united in the Socialist International had a membership of 15 million and their vote in parliamentary elections totaled over 70 million. Due to the pressure exerted by their members and voters, they have increasingly directed their attention toward the problems concerning the safeguarding of peace. General declarations for peace have been complemented by statements advocating continuation

of concrete negotiations on arms limitation and disarmament. An increasing number of members and functionaries of these parties have been taking part in mass demonstrations against the stationing of new American medium-range missiles in West Europe. Nevertheless, it is obvious that there are great contradictions among and within the parties of the Socialist International--contradictions ranging from strict rejection to support of the United States' new missile deployment.

Now that the most aggressive circles, above all those of U.S. imperialism, are pursuing a policy of confrontation vis-a-vis the socialist countries, thus intensifying the threat of war, the position taken by the Socialist International (SI)--a position supporting the struggle of the nations for the safeguarding of world peace, for arms limitation and disarmament--is of special significance.

The SI--within which both socialist and social-democratic parties are united--has considerable influence, above all in the countries of West and North Europe and in Japan, and it is trying to extend this influence in other regions of the world. At the beginning of the 1980's, the parties of the SI had a membership of approximately 15 million and they obtained over 70 million votes. In a number of West European states, Socialists or Social Democrats share governmental responsibility, e.g. in the FRG, in Austria, France, Greece, Denmark and Finland. In other countries, e.g. in Great Britain and in Sweden, they are the strongest opposition parties in the parliament. Regardless of whether they share governmental responsibility or whether they represent the parliamentary opposition--and despite the many problems they face on account of the further aggravation of the general crisis of capitalism--they exert great influence on the working class of these countries. For this reason, the positions the SI's most influential parties have taken in regard to the threat of war, the problem concerning the struggle for the continuation of detente, and the termination of the imperialist arms race are of great significance.

Social-Democratic leaders have repeatedly--and more or less unanimously--stressed the need for a political detente complemented by military detente. They state that the safeguarding of peace must take precedence in the present political situation. But in quite a few of them, there is a discrepancy between word and deed in regard to the struggle for the safeguarding of peace, for arms limitation and detente. "Present-day social democracy has considerable political influence. It could do still more toward defending the vital interests of all peoples, strengthening peace and normalizing the international situation.... In practice, however, the leaders of social democracy do not always pursue those objectives."¹

The discussions at the SI congresses and buro conferences and the statements and activities of various social-democratic and socialist parties show that within international social democracy there exists today a broad spectrum of views regarding the requirements of arms limitation and disarmament. This spectrum ranges from unequivocal rejection of the United States' imperialist armament and confrontation course to open support of NATO's armament policy. For the most part, however, the majority of the socialist-democratic forces have adopted more or less realistic, peace-promoting positions. At present, most of the social-democratic leaders take a position that is critically opposed to that of the most aggressive circles of U.S. monopoly capitalism. One of the primary--foreign policy-related--reasons for

this is the fact that the SI's most influential forces operate in the countries of West and North Europe. Due to this geographic situation, West European politicians--above all the representatives of social democracy--have adopted an attitude of reserve and rejection vis-a-vis Reagan's plans to set up the framework for a limited nuclear war on the European continent.

In contrast to U.S. imperialism, leading circles of West Europe's monopoly capitalism want to maintain and extend the economic results of detente.² Evidence of this was the recent insistence of the governments of France and the FRG on the natural gas deal with the USSR. As is well known, social-democratic politicians of West Europe have greatly helped to implement this policy and this has been a contributing factor in enhancing the attractiveness of their parties and it has made them defenders of detente. However, this position is circumscribed by the anti-Soviet and anti-communist orientation of a large part of the social-democratic leadership. Evidence of this are the repeated defamation campaigns against the socialist states that were launched with the object of "substantiating" the imperialist policy of confrontation and intensive armament. The latest examples: the aspersions on the Soviet Union in connection with the problems concerning medium-range missiles or with the events in the People's Republic of Poland.

Changes in the SI's Positions

During the SI's 30 years of existence, its positions vis-a-vis the socialist countries underwent considerable changes. During the period of the Cold War, the policy pursued by the social-democratic parties vis-a-vis real socialism did not materially differ from that of the conservative and liberal circles. "The rightist forces of social democracy were guided by blind anti-communism and anti-Sovietism; they were active participants in the imperialist policy of aggression and they defended this policy before the working masses."³ Leading social-democratic politicians actively helped to build and expand NATO. For a long time, the SI itself was an instrument of the Cold War.⁴

The proposals of the socialist countries, which were oriented toward implementation of the principles of peaceful coexistence, were rejected. Similarly, the attacks of social-democratic parties against the socialist countries in the field of ideology hardly differed from those launched by conservative circles.

The change in the global distribution of forces in favor of socialism was the main reason why the social-democratic leaders adopted a more realistic policy vis-a-vis the socialist countries and why social democracy made an important contribution to the implementation of political detente. Presently, at the beginning of the 1980's, social democracy again faces changed international conditions in regard to its operational scope. Due to the United States' policy of confrontation vis-a-vis socialism and the national liberation movement, the international situation has changed. In many respects, this policy is not in accordance with the views and interests prevalent within social democracy--namely that a policy pursued on the brink of war has already been shown to be inappropriate for the contest with socialism and that it also strengthens the positions of the most reactionary forces of imperialism, while weakening those of the social democrats.

The peace movement, which in most of the imperialist countries has turned into a mass movement, exerts great influence on the political work of social democracy.

It should be noted, however, that the response of the individual parties and within the social-democratic parties varies greatly--evidence of which is readily obtained through observation of the SPD. At any rate, the rapid growth of the peace movement has greatly stimulated the discussion within social democracy on the need for preservation of peace. Thus, in the policy pursued by the SI, there have come to the fore four basic trends:

Firstly: the problems concerning the safeguarding of peace, political detente, arms limitation and disarmament have assumed overriding significance. This is reflected not only by the congresses held since the mid-1970's, but also by the work of the SI's Study Team for Disarmament headed by the Finnish Social Democrat Kalevi Sorsa. At the beginning of this year, members of this study team met--for the second time--with the general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee and chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, L. I. Brezhnev. Similarly, the international activities of leading social-democratic personalities such as SI President W. Brandt, B. Kreisky and O. Palme have intensified. O. Palme, chairman of Sweden's Social Democratic Workers Party, heads the independent International Commission for Disarmament, which is made up of quite diverse elements.⁵

Secondly: There have crystallized different, even mutually opposed positions on key problems regarding the safeguarding of peace and, above all, on the problems concerning armament. Presently there are serious differences of opinion--both among the parties of the SI and within the SI itself--on NATO's Missile Resolution, on NATO's armament policy and on the United States' policy of confrontation. Accordingly, the political activities in and vis-a-vis the peace movement are very contradictory.

Within the SI, the SPD, which on account of its leading role in the process of detente enjoyed considerable respect among the other social-democratic parties, obviously has lost much of this respect in the last few years.

Thirdly: There is increasing alarm about the foreign policy pursued by the U.S. administration under President Reagan--an alarm extending to the organization's leading circles. This goes above all for the reluctance to engage in negotiations with the Soviet Union, the policy pursued vis-a-vis Latin America, the armament policy based on superiority claims, and the sanction-oriented policy vis-a-vis socialist states.

Fourthly: In many respects, the positions formulated in the congress resolutions and in the documents of the Study Team for Disarmament agree with or approximate those of the socialist countries. Since the SI resolutions are merely of a recommendatory nature and thus are not binding on the member parties, they can by no means be equated with appropriate political action. The contradiction between word and deed seen in some social-democratic politicians is attributable above all to anti-communism and anti-Sovietism.

Basic Positions Concerning Detente and Disarmament

At present, elimination of this contradiction largely depends on whether social democracy will be able to maintain against U.S. imperialism's opposition--and politically to implement--its oft-repeated standpoint that there is no reasonable alternative to detente. Under the present conditions, the insistence on the policy

of detente not only assumes increasing importance, but also requires of social democracy greater efforts in regard to consistent defense of its relatively independent positions; as regards political practice, this would necessitate unequivocally to reject the United States' militant, anti-communist, crusading policy of sanctions, boycott and armament and to promote the constructive continuance of the CSCE process, including the Madrid Conference. It turns out, however, that regarding these problems some social-democratic leaders are giving in to the pressure exerted by the United States. This runs counter to their declared goal to continue the policy of detente and it has caused considerable disputes in some of the parties.

Social democracy is more or less agreed that detente can last only if arms limitation and disarmament are implemented. In various declarations--such as the one made at its Paris bureau conference (September 1981)--the SI advocated negotiations between the United States and the USSR. A remarkable aspect of the Paris conference was the statement that "both sides" should consider concluding "an interim agreement on qualitative and quantitative restrictions at a level below the present one."⁶ Previously, the Soviet Union had submitted the moratorium proposal that subsequently was extended to the effect that the Soviet Union was prepared--provided the United States agreed--to withdraw some of its missiles from the western border of the Soviet Union.

Thus this offer corresponds with what the SI had formulated in Paris. Along with the U.S. government, however, well-known social-democratic politicians rejected or denounced as "unsatisfactory" both the moratorium proposal and the subsequent unconditional and unilateral moratorium of the USSR. But the SI parties would be well advised to consider that the policy of U.S. imperialism--as manifested by the resolutions concerning the production of the neutron bomb and the resumption of the production of chemical weapons and by its unprecedented intensification of the armament program--is clearly opposed to the SI's declared position, namely that "both sides" should nowhere "take any steps"⁷ that could jeopardize the results of negotiations.

The SI standpoints conforming with the positions taken by the socialist countries include certain views concerning various steps to be taken on the road toward disarmament. For example, the SI emphasizes the importance for Europe of successful negotiations on arms limitation and disarmament and the necessity as quickly as possible to draft agreements on nuclear medium-range missiles. At the executive board meeting held in Bonn at the beginning of April 1982, this stance of the Socialist International was affirmed. Its president, W. Brandt, stated these negotiations were of crucial importance for preventing a catastrophe for mankind; Brandt declared it was necessary to promote steps conducive to disarmament agreements.⁸

Like the socialist states, the SI attaches great importance to the Vienna negotiations. It had advocated the ratification of SALT II and presently it supports the continuation of the SALT process. The SI documents contain demands for the prohibition of chemical weapons and of the development of new types and systems of weapons for mass destruction and demands for a European disarmament conference that was to be prepared at the Madrid Conference. In view of the United States' negative attitude on this issue, a real commitment by the SI and its member parties to the staging of such a conference and to obtaining constructive results could be of great significance.

Some new accents in the report delivered by the Study Team for Disarmament at its Madrid Congress (1980) are worth mentioning. This report contained a number of recommendations to the SI member parties, which--if applied in political practice--would increase social democracy's contribution to the struggle for peace: There is the appeal to fight against militarism and the militarization of society, to draw up national programs toward disarmament, to work out plans for converting armaments production into civilian production and to form national disarmament committees; then there is the recommendation to establish independent bodies for disarmament policy, which are to draw up action programs for disarmament initiatives, etc.⁹

As has already been stated, the social-democratic parties have been relatively unanimous in dissociating themselves from the U.S. plans concerning production of the neutron bomb. As early as the second half of the 1970's, social-democratic forces had for the most part rejected Carter's neutron bomb plans and when Reagan resolved to implement these plans after all, there arose sharp protest. Quite a few Social Democrats, including some in positions of leadership, proceed from the assumption that this would reduce the nuclear war "threshold" and complicate the negotiations on arms limitation and disarmament.

Regarding the United States' present military policy, Karel van Miert, chairman of the (Flemish) Socialist Party of Belgium, stated: "The United States is concerned about how to win the war, while the Europeans are concerned about how to prevent it."¹⁰

Differences in Outlook on NATO and on the Brussels Missile Resolutions

Side by side with these shared views on war and peace, there are differences in outlook on key issues. The differences in regard to the need for and the evaluation of the North Atlantic Treaty are quite apparent. While the SPD's West Berlin Party Congress (1979) called NATO an "instrument of peace" and made an unequivocal commitment "to the alliance,"¹¹ other parties have great reservations vis-a-vis NATO. Above all, this applies to the Greek Pan-Hellenic Socialist Movement (PASOK). Greece's new government has advocated the country's withdrawal from NATO's military organization and it made known its intention to negotiate anew on the U.S. bases on Greek soil. The Spanish socialists resolutely oppose their country's accession to NATO. They hold that the integration of Spain into the military bloc would tie the country still more closely to the United States.

In other countries, too, social-democratic parties have condemned the policy pursued by NATO or have advocated withdrawal of their countries from this aggressive military bloc. This goes for significant elements in the parties of Norway, Denmark, the Netherlands and--increasingly so--Great Britain. The SI member parties also differ in regard to the advisability of unilateral steps toward arms limitation. The leadership of the SPD and of other West European parties rejects such steps, whereas the Labor Party--presently in the opposition--stresses the usefulness of unilateral disarmament measures and advocates dissolution of the nuclear bases in Great Britain and elimination of the British nuclear arsenal. The Dutch Labor Party (PvdA)--along with other peace-oriented forces of the country--holds that all nuclear weapons must be removed from the earth, with "the Netherlands leading the way."

That these elements succeeded in bringing their influence to bear on the final resolution of the Madrid SI Congress is evidenced by the statement that "unilateral steps by individual governments" could be advantageous to negotiations concerning arms control and disarmament.¹² As late as 1976, at the Geneva Congress, it had been stated that lasting security could /not/ [word enclosed in slantlines printed in italics] be produced by unilateral disarmament steps or by disengagement.¹³ Undoubtedly, the changes in the SI's stances on this issue reflect "the growing power of the protest movement of large segments of the West European public against the peace-threatening plans of NATO."¹⁴ At present, the main source of conflict among the SI parties is the difference in outlook on NATO's Missile Resolution. Thus the SI has never officially commented on this resolution. One of the SPD's experts on SI concerns stated that "during the conflict over the NATO Two-Track Resolution" it had not even been possible "to effect compromises among the divergent positions of the European SI members."¹⁵ It is above all the leading circles of the SPD, but also the leaders of the Italian and the French socialists, who champion the Missile Resolution, whereas the Dutch Labor Party (PvdA) and the (Flemish) Socialist Party of Belgium advocate its abrogation. The British Labor Party and the Danish Social Democrats reject the stationing on their country's territories.¹⁶

However, even within the parties that support the resolution there is increasing opposition to the planned stationing. This goes above all for the SPD. Many members of this party are deeply concerned about the possibility that the new U.S. missiles and the intensive armament policy may undo the policy of detente that the Social Democrats helped to establish during the 1970's. They proceed from the fact that it was the United States, not the Soviet Union, that toppled the SALT II Agreement and that the policy of confrontation is promoted by U.S. imperialism, while the Soviet Union again and again submits peace-promoting proposals.

These views and the rapid spread of the peace movement in the FRG are the main reasons why a growing number of SPD members, functionaries and subgroups have been engaging in the diverse peace-promoting activities. A large number of Social Democrats signed the Krefeld Appeal and participated in the Bonn peace demonstration on 10 October 1981; 30,000 SPD members signed the Bielefeld Appeal, which likewise opposes the stationing of U.S. medium-range missiles.¹⁷ A number of district and state organizations and the work groups of the SPD's Young Socialists and Social-Democratic Women have come out against the stationing resolution.¹⁸ Among other organizations, the Schleswig-Holstein State Association demanded in a petition addressed to the Munich Party Congress (April 1982) that the armament section in NATO's "Two-Track Resolution" be revoked and that the preparations for the stationing of the new American medium-range missiles be halted.¹⁹

The divergence in the views regarding NATO's missile resolutions is closely bound up with the evaluation of the military-strategic equilibrium. While most of those who oppose the resolutions realistically assume the existence of an approximate equilibrium, the supporters of the missile resolution consider the Soviet Union to be superior. Essentially, they follow the argumentation of the most aggressive imperialist circles, which have advanced unverifiable allegations concerning forced armament on the part of the Soviet Union.

Divergent Views of Social Democracy in and on the Peace Movement

As regards the views of socialist and social-democratic parties on the peace movement, one can discern three basic trends:

Firstly: There are parties (including their leaderships) that are actively committed to the peace movement, that participate or even help initiate actions. One of these parties is the British Labor Party, whose executive committee as early as the summer of 1980 resolved to support the activities of the "Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament." The Dutch Labor Party and the Belgian socialist parties likewise actively participate in the struggle against the imperialist armament escalation. These parties more or less combine their parliamentary work with extra-parliamentary activities.

Secondly: There are parties whose leaderships take a benevolent or tolerant view of their members' and functionaries' participation in the peace movement. This goes for the attitude of social-democratic parties of the Scandinavian countries vis-a-vis the actions of their youth organizations--actions aimed at establishing a nonnuclear zone in North Europe.

Thirdly: There are parties in which only a certain number of the members and functionaries are committed to the peace movement; since the activities of these members are also aimed at their own leaders and governmental representatives, one finds in these parties intensive debates on the policies concerning peace and armament. This goes above all for the SPD, in which the intra-party debate culminated in the discussions before and during the Munich Party Congress in April 1982.

Ideological Obstacles to Consistent Commitment in the Struggle for Peace

Social-reformist forces usually do not think that international tensions and conflicts are caused by imperialism's objective aggressiveness, i.e. an aggressiveness based on its socioeconomic structure. Rather, certain circles try--by regarding as identical the United States and the USSR as so-called superpowers--to gloss over this interconnection. It is precisely this "superpower" ideology that prevents many Social Democrats from recognizing the true culprits in regard to the arms race and the threat of war. Statements to this effect were included in the resolution of the Madrid Congress, in which resolution not only the United States, but also the USSR were alleged to want to make a limited nuclear war winnable.²⁰ Other comments likewise more or less ignore--in connection with this alleged identity of the two great powers--the many proposals submitted by the USSR in regard to prevention of a nuclear war.

Removed from the class struggles of our time, leading social-reformist circles base their alternatives concerning the present international situation on general ethical considerations based on the ideology of "democratic socialism." Proceeding from such political-ideological standpoints, leading social-democratic parties are pursuing a policy oriented toward "liberalization of communist states" and toward an alleged development toward "social democracy" in the capitalist countries.²¹ This is to produce an impression of objectivity. But if in evaluating this policy one goes beyond the declarations and takes into account the concrete measures, it becomes obvious that now as ever leading social-democratic forces are bent on weakening--by means of detente--the strongest peace-oriented power, the community

of socialist states. Ultimately, this is bound to weaken and split the peace movement.

Aside from these ideological trends--trends that for many years have been prevalent in international social democracy--new tendencies have been emerging at the beginning of the 1980's. Within social democracy, there are growing the forces that seek the causes of the intensive armament policy in the social conditions prevailing in the imperialist countries and that consider the profit urge one of the key factors. Increasingly, Social Democrats regard intensive armament as a primary cause of the intensifying crises in state monopoly capitalism. Some of them draw attention to the close interrelationship between reactionary crisis management and increased aggression toward the outside. One encounters such insights above all in social-democratic youth organizations and trade union subgroups. As the crisis-related burdens are increasingly shifted onto the working people, these groups see more and more clearly an interconnection between intensive armament and social service cuts. In the future, this may become an even more effective source for maintaining the commitment of Social Democrats, above all those active in the trade unions.

Increased Influence on International Crisis Areas

In order to increase its influence in Africa and Latin America, the SI--and first and foremost its leading politicians--is trying to play "mediator" among the forces active in the various crisis areas of the world. These efforts likewise aim to effect a "compensation of interests" so as to halt further changes of the global distribution of forces in favor of socialism. It is obvious, however, that these plans are impaired by the foreign policy of U.S. imperialism.

In the conflict in the Near East, the SI leaders proceed from the Camp David Agreement, but they consider its framework too narrow to obtain a political solution. This goes above all for the problem of Palestine and for the role of the PLO. The SI leaders advocate "greater flexibility" in regard to these issues. Their efforts in the Near East, which in the last few years have been intensified, are aimed at effecting a "compensation of interests" between the Arabic states and Israel so as to insure for the long term the influence of imperialism (above all West European imperialism) in this area. The desire of some SI groups for a more flexible policy--a policy that if necessary would recognize the Palestinians' right to their own state and the role of the PLO as the legitimate representative of the Palestinian people--and the resistance against such a policy by other SI groups (above all by Israel's Workers Party) have led to contradictions and conflicts within the organization, which came to a head at the last congress in Madrid.²²

Regarding the aggression-oriented policy of the racist regime in South Africa, the SI has issued critical statements; it is pressing for reform of the Apartheid system so as to maintain through concessions the positions of the global capitalist system in that country. The SI condemns South Africa's acts of aggression vis-a-vis Angola and other states and it supports the independence of Namibia, but it does not consider SWAPO the only legitimate representative of the Namibian people.

Aside from the political aspect, there is a significant ideological side to the various activities of the SI and its most important member parties in the crisis areas of the world and to its comments and declarations concerning detente and

disarmament. Leading social-democratic forces are trying to utilize it so as to give credibility to social democracy as a third force between socialism and capitalism. Social-democratic politicians and ideologists hope that in a world, "in which a polarization process"²³ is taking place between capitalism and communism, there will be an increased need for a third political force. And they are trying through attainment of positions in the developing countries to make more convincing the existence of such a third force. To be sure, these efforts are not very promising, since it has always been shown that the developing countries sooner or later have to choose between capitalism and control by multinational concerns on the one hand and socialist orientation and truly independent economic development on the other hand. For the time being, however, they may yield favorable results for social democracy.

Objective Causes of Contradictory Positions

Analysis of the SI's positions on preservation of peace and on the need for arms limitation and disarmament shows that while they differ in many respects from the most reactionary and aggressive elements of monopoly capitalism, they are in themselves very contradictory. There are considerable differences between the resolutions and declarations of the SI on the one hand and the concrete political actions of its leading circles on the other hand.

Essentially, the inconsistencies of the positions and actions are rooted in the nature of social democracy. More than ever, a large number of the social-democratic leaders are closely linked to the power mechanism of state monopoly capitalism. At the same time, they are forced to take into account the interests of the working masses. Thus social democracy occupies a "position between the monopoly capital-related trend toward political reaction and the democratic aspirations of the working people."²⁴

As regards the problem of peace, the pressure on social democracy is growing from both sides. On the one hand, the most aggressive circles of monopoly capitalism are trying to force social-democratic politicians to give in to the policy of confrontation; on the other hand, there is the growing power of the peace movement, to which many members of social-democratic and socialist parties are committed. Due to their great influence on the working people of the capitalist countries, the parties of the SI--irrespective of whether or not they share governmental responsibility--bear great responsibility. To a large extent, it depends on their policies whether or not arms limitation and detente can be enforced and nuclear war prevented.

There are a number of objective and long-term factors that promote a realistic policy and thus help increase the peace potential of social democracy:²⁵

--The social basis of social democracy undoubtedly is the most important source of the peace potential. The socialist and social-democratic parties exert a strong influence on the working class. Many members still adhere to the antimilitaristic traditions of the workers' movement. A considerable number of the members and functionaries of the social-democratic parties and of the trade unions influenced by them take part in social discussions and actions of the peace movement. The leading circles of social democracy must take this into consideration.

--Critical elements within the social-democratic and socialist parties of West Europe justly point out that in the last decade a constructive policy oriented toward peaceful coexistence, detente and peace greatly helped to increase their own influence and in the debate on internal affairs to keep in check conservative or reactionary forces.

The boundless rise in defense expenditures further restricts the governments' reduced sociopolitical latitude--which is needed by social reformism in particular. Irrespective of the stance of certain social-democratic politicians, this counteracts the specific influence of the social-democratic parties that share governmental responsibility. In the interest of consolidation of the peace-loving forces and of maintaining the influence over the masses, an increasing number of leading functionaries and representatives have proposed that the struggle for arms limitation and detente be linked with the struggle for the social interests of the working people.

--Social-democratic leaders consider the problems concerning detente and disarmament to offer especially good chances for setting themselves off against the conservative parties and for extending their own influence. Moreover, the growing readiness of all segments of the population to stand up against the threat of a devastating nuclear war directly influences the attitude of the social-democratic leaders.

All this indicates that in spite of the great inconsistencies in the last 2 years there has been an intensification of the social-democratic commitment to peace and to joint actions of all opponents of the renewed nuclear armament launched by U.S. imperialism. However, this is being opposed by the imperialist circles, who are stepping up the Cold War and the policy of confrontation and who through their anticommunist slogans are defaming the peace movement. In some instances, this may serve to weaken the peace movement. However, in view of the serious danger brought on by NATO, one can expect continuance of the commitment to peace on the part of the SI parties and their members and one can also expect further consolidation of the peace-loving forces against the policy pursued by the most aggressive circles of imperialism. This commitment is based on the growing realization--a realization again and again emphasized by the communists--that peace can be insured only through the determined struggle of large segments of the population against the armament policy of imperialism.

FOOTNOTES

1. "26th CPSU Congress. Report of the CPSU Central Committee and the Next Tasks of the Party in Regard to Domestic and Foreign Policy. Speaker: L. I. Brezhnev," Berlin, 1981, p 26.
2. See "Imperialist Confrontation and Armament Policy Encounters Resistance," IPW-BERICHT, No 8, 1981, p 4.
3. "Staatsmonopolistischer Kapitalismus und Opportunismus" [State Monopoly Capitalism and Opportunism], Berlin, 1979, p 173.

4. Regarding the policy pursued by the SI vis-a-vis the socialist countries in the 1950's, see "Sozialistische Internationale. Ihre Geschichte und Politik" [Socialist International. Its History and Policies], Berlin, 1977, Chapter 3.2.
5. Among others, the commission includes the CPSU Central Committee member Arbatov, the former U.S. Secretary of State Vance and the SPD politician Bahr.
6. SI resolution on disarmament adopted at its Paris bureau conference on 25 September 1981 (photocopy).
7. Ibid.
8. NEUES DEUTSCHLAND, 3/4 Apr 82.
9. H. Jungblut, "The 15th Congress of the Socialist International," HORIZONT, No 1, 1981.
10. Quoted in: W. Schweizer, "Military Detente and Social Democracy," NEUE ZEIT, Moscow, No 44, 1981, p 19.
11. "Security Policy within the Framework of Peace Policy. Motion by the Party Executive Board in the Version Adopted by the SPD Congress (3 to 7 December 1979)," POLITIK. AKTUELLE INFORMATION DER SPD, No 15, 1979, p 2.
12. "The Resolution of the Congress of the Socialist International. Madrid, 13-16 November 1980," in: "Sozialistische Internationale: Die grosse Alternative" [Socialist International: The Great Alternative], Vienna, no date, p 25.
13. "Resolution on the Political Situation, Adopted at the 13th Congress of the Socialist International in Geneva, November 1976," EUROPA-ARCHIV, No 6, 1977, p D 147.
14. H. Jungblut, op. cit.
15. R. Seidelmann, "The Socialist International as Party Movement and Political Vanguard," EUROPA-ARCHIV, No 21, 1981, p 663.
16. According to NATO's Brussels Missile Resolution, the stationing of medium-range missiles is projected for Great Britain, but not for Denmark.
17. See UNSERE ZEIT, Duesseldorf, 28 Jan 82.
18. See K. Schacht, "NATO Missile Resolution and Bonn's Policy of Cuts--These Issues Polarize the Minds in the SPD," UNSERE ZEIT, 19 Nov 81.
19. Ibid.
20. "The Resolution of the Congress...", op. cit., p 16.

21. "Program of the Socialist Party of Austria. Adopted at the Vienna Party Congress on 20 May 1978," ARBEITERZEITUNG, Vienna, 25 May 78.
22. The conflicts revolve above all around the role of the PLO. The Spanish and the Italian Socialists opposed a majority resolution that no longer expressly mentioned the PLO as the sole representative of the Palestinian people.
23. B. Kreisky, Speech at the SPD's 1979 Congress in West Berlin (photocopy).
24. "Social Reformism. Theories, Policies, Contradictions," IPW-FORSCHUNGSHEFTE, No 2, 1979, p 6.
25. See H. Dietzel, "Reformistische Arbeiterbewegung heute" [Reformist Workers Movement Today], Berlin, 1981, pp 95-100.

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CSO: 2300/332

IDEOLOGICAL EDUCATION IN CHILD REARING TO BE STRESSED

West German Commentary

Bonn IWE-TAGESDIENST in German No 102, 8 Jul 82 p 4

/Report from Berlin: "Influence on Family Education to Be Intensified." A translation of the East Berlin PAEDAGOGIK article cited below follows this commentary/

/Text/ The East Berlin magazine PAEDAGOGIK (No 6, 1982) calls for greater influence on child rearing in the GDR. It justifies this demand by the family's great importance for the "shaping of the outlook" of children and young people regarding basic ideological issues. It is imperative to offer greater "pedagogical aid" in view of the family's role in the rearing of "good citizens." Some parents are said to be unduly strained, especially with respect to ideological education and their educational efforts not always successful. Conversely it would be necessary more emphatically to apply the experiences of successful parents in order to enrich the collected knowledge of pedagogy.

GDR Educator's Discussion

East Berlin PAEDAGOGIK in German Vol 37 No 6, Jun 82 (signed to press 20 May 82)
pp 494-501

/Article by Prof Dr Rosemarie Walther, deputy director for research, F.A.W. Diesterweg Education Department, Humboldt University, East Berlin: "Family Education According to the Working Class"/

/Text/ On 5 July 1982 we will celebrate the 125th anniversary of Clara Zetkin's birth. She was a great revolutionary and internationalist, an outstanding leader in the German and international socialist women's movement.

Clara Zetkin's lifelong work is of the utmost topicality from several aspects: Her passionate fight for peace and socialism as the representative of the German left, her personal commitment to the young Soviet state and her friendship for the peoples of the Soviet Union, her leading role in the struggle for women's equality.

As the intimate comrade-at-arms of Karl Liebknecht and Rosa Luxemburg, Clara Zetkin's entire life was devoted to the working class struggle for a new world. She fought the nefarious politics of imperialism with passion and courage.

V.I. Lenin held Clara Zetkin in high esteem as a passionate revolutionary. In 1927, on the occasion of Clara Zetkin's 70th birthday, N.K. Krupskaya wrote in the Russian magazine ARBEITERIN: "Anyone who has studied the works of Marx and Engels is aware that they did not consider the struggle for the socialization of production a political struggle only but held it also to be the organization of completely new relationships among people, the development of the human personality, the deepening of all human experiences. Clara Zetkin has devoted particular attention to that aspect of Marxism."¹ She combined this extensive political activity in the working class fight against war, exploitation and oppression with full-scale educational and pedagogical work.

Clara Zetkin's educational views arose from the goals of the working class and its educational demands in the dispute with the educational system of German imperialism. It is opposed to the chauvinist spirit of education in the schools and severely condemns the lack of education suffered by children in elementary schools, "the cinderella among the schools" in imperial Germany. In the era of the Weimar Republic also she campaigned for the comprehensive education of all children and the democratization of the school.

The close link between the political struggle and educational issues is one of the traditions of the workers movement. Appreciation of the parents individual responsibility is slowly maturing. It requires the conscious influence of the family, the close links between family life and the political struggle of the class, to recruit our children as future comrades-at-arms and equip them to withstand the nefarious and destructive influences of capitalism. Constantly emphasized is the responsibility of parents, especially party members, for the conscious and consistent education of children in the spirit of socialism. Assistance to family education becomes an important political assignment of the socialist movement. At the head of the socialist women's movement, Clara Zetkin and her women comrades combine their work for the recruitment of women for socialist politics with the educational tasks arising therefrom. The 1910 resolution "on the struggle for peace," for example, states:

"For just this purpose we must encourage the enlightenment of the female proletariat about the causes of war and its basis--the capitalist system--and about the aims of socialism...For just this purpose we must educate our children to be socialists and ensure that the fighting proletariat, this army of peace, grows every larger and more numerous."²

Building upon the theorems of the classics of Marxism and upon practical political work with women, she submitted reasoned statements on the value and the potential of family education for the family committed to the cause of the working class.³ Her report to the Mannheim SPD Congress of 1906, in particular, must be considered basic to the development of socialist family pedagogy.⁴ Moreover she touched upon problems of family education in many reports and brochures. While editing the women's magazine GLEICHHEIT /Equality/ (from 1892-1917), together with Kaete Duncker and Edwin Hoernle, she provided many suggestions and recommendations for everyday child rearing, in addition to fundamental contributions to family and social politics. Some of these were once again made accessible to the public, in particular by the efforts of G. Hohendorf.⁵

In view of the great importance we assign family education in our society, it seems appropriate to once again analyze Clara Zetkin's concepts on child rearing in order to trace their significance for modern ideas about the educational process in the family.

The Proletarian Family and Child Rearing

Clara Zetkin developed her opinions on child rearing as part and parcel of the theoretical concept and practical struggle of the proletariat in the fight against exploitation and oppression.

The development of large-scale industry in the 19th Century and the evolution of the proletariat caused a radical change in the lifestyle of the family. The migration from villages to cities altered the old family structures. The extreme exploitation inherent in the early stages of the capitalist system wreaked havoc with family life. Specially characteristic for the living conditions of workers were the double exploitation to which women were subjected, long working hours at low wages, miserable housing and the severe nature of child labor in the second half of the 19th and at the beginning of the 20th centuries.

In the "Communist Manifesto" Marx and Engels summed up the situation of the proletarian family: "Bourgeois phrases about family and education, the cozy relationship between parents and children, are the more repulsive, the more--as a result of large-scale industry--all family ties in the proletariat are torn and the children turned into no more than commodities and laboring hands."⁶

The issue of the value of child rearing in such living conditions is often raised in the workers movement. In the dispute with the representatives of anticommunism, who allege that socialists wish to abolish the family, it is constantly stressed that the educational function of the family is virtually denied by the situation of the proletariat, by capitalist exploitation, the misery and lack of knowledge of the masses caused by social conditions. Clara Zetkin is not blind to such ideas either. And yet, the working class' responsibility for the new generation and the contemplation of the basic changes in lifestyle after the proletarian revolution are the basis of the concept, stated by August Bebel as far back as 1878, that social education and family education will be at one in the socialist society, and that parents, themselves involved in the "organization of the educational system" will have more time to spare for educating their children.⁷

The necessity of the interrelation between public education and child rearing becomes a characteristic educational assumption by Clara Zetkin. "Parental education and public education do not follow one another, they complement one another. We cannot do without parental education in the home, so that the children may grow up to be strong personalities with full individuality. We need common education in public institutions so that the personality may not degenerate into narcissism, so that it may be linked with the community in fraternal sentiment and inclination, and fully appreciate what it owes to it."⁹

From this necessary interrelation she also concludes the duty of the proletariat, especially the mothers, to struggle for the fundamental reform of the educational system. An important prerequisite for family education in the worker family are

the results of the political struggles of the working class and the triumph of sociopolitical demands. "A good education at home presumes thorough social reform... The 8-hour day and extensive housing reform represent for me the core of a healthy social policy aimed to make the proletarian family able to rear its children."¹⁰

The development of the working class generates new relations within the family also. They differ fundamentally from relationships in the bourgeois family, because these are primarily based on economic considerations. From the fact of the involvement of women in the production process, the style of family life is necessarily changed. The equality of spouses begins when the woman exercises a profession and stands on her own two feet. "When...in the proletariat the woman is entirely or to some extent unable--as the result of her involvement in the army of full-time women workers--so to carry out her duties as the educator of the children as would be desirable with a view to the educational outcome, circumstances dictate...that, regardless of male or female stereotypes, the husband moves to her side to help out. We must welcome as an advance the very circumstance that need compels the husband to do so, and this advanced must be consciously pursued as planned. It is the start of man's beginning to assume his duties as the comrade of the woman in the responsible work of child rearing."¹¹

Education to Socialist Feeling and Reflection

It is Zetkin's basic requirement that parents educate their children in the spirit of socialist ideology and morality. It is "the duty of socialist parents on the basis of their ideology gradually to introduce their children to socialist feeling and reflection."¹² The parents example, their way of allowing the children to participate in their experiences and their value judgments, patiently answer their questions--these are to inspire the children to think for themselves, to compare and adopt attitudes.

Clara Zetkin's son Maxim reports that she herself successfully used this method in her family to educate her two sons: "She did everything possible to bring us up as conscious socialist, ready and willing to struggle and sacrifice. However, she did not do this by crude 'agitation at home' but by allowing us to get involved in her own life, her work in and for the party and the political life of our entire environment--of course in the matter and to the extent appropriate to our respective ages. She drew our attention to the many dark aspects of life in a class society, for example, which we might not have noticed by ourselves nor have been able to defend ourselves against its pernicious influences. Most of all she constantly pointed out to us the more profound causes of the sickening conditions prevailing at the time."¹³

She assigned particular value to training children to observe the world in nature and society, so as to direct their attention to the connections and the natural course of the processes involved. Clara Zetkins lists three educational tasks crucial in the family for the development of the personality:

- Training of the proper will,
- Training in the use of freedom,
- The fundamental shaping of the will and the intellect by the very first training of the child.

By "training the proper will" she means teaching action appropriate to the spirit of the working class. Her explanations on training in the use of freedom ask us to respect in the child the growing individual, the citizen of the community; she condemns a relationship of rigid authority between parents and children. She calls upon the parents to guide and persuade rather than compel their children. She considers an essential method of education their training in the exercise of free decisionmaking, in the appreciation of that which is useful, necessary and ethical.

Clara Zetkin included among the methods indispensable for family education the aid of literature and art. She tried to provide substantial children's literature by adding a children's supplement to GLEICHHEIT. At the same time, though, she always linked her demand for pedagogically valuable literature with the proviso that the child should, by way of literature, live with the ideals of the working class and get to know man as the hero who organizes and struggles with his comrades.

Clara Zetkin also attributes great importance to the training for work so as to establish a proper attitude to society. She was among the outstanding accusers of child labor. At the same time she describes training in productive work as the most important feature of domestic education. "The greatest joy of children arises from the feeling, in free and creative activity, to have done something useful and valuable, though to an adult their efforts may appear wrong or superfluous."¹⁴

Socialist esteem for work and pleasure in work are to be taught in the family by the joint labors of parents and children. She considers example and encouragement the most appropriate methods. She sees particularly great opportunities in domestic training for the equality of education of boys and girls. "Boys and girls should be able skillfully and happily to handle all work involved in housekeeping."¹⁵

Training in socialist feeling and thought requires the family also to devote the greatest possible attention to the tasks of patriotic and internationalist education. In the fight against chauvinism and militarism, for the resolution of the social issues, the working class develops its own concept of patriotism, linking the struggle for a socialist fatherland indivisibly with proletarian internationalism. In her antiwar speech of 1912 in Basle, Clara Zetkin describes the consciousness of international solidarity as the precious heritage of culture and human development to be passed on from mothers to children.

In the years before the October Revolution, Clara Zetkin's main thoughts on the education for internationalism and patriotism are directed to the struggle against the imperialist war. She enthusiastically welcomes the October Revolution as providing a new dimension to the concept of internationalism. The young Soviet Union is the fatherland of the workers. Her fondest wish is to make women and mothers appreciate the historic dimensions of the developments in the Soviet Union and, subsequently, train the young generation in friendship to the Soviet Union. Such papers as "The Importance of the Building Soviet Union for the German Working Class," "In Liberated Caucasus" breathe this spirit. All the experiences she herself described, the memories of talks with Lenin and analyses of developments in the Soviet Union convey to us to this day her powers of persuasion and her love for the Soviet State.¹⁶

Clara Zetkin's Wishes Carried Out in the GDR

Present-day family education in the GDR proceeds in conditions resulting from the long and hard struggles of the working class.

Our families develop on the basis of the peace policy of our state, of social security and the equality of all citizens, a high standard of education and culture. The discussion about the development of child rearing in the GDR demonstrates that the new lifestyle of the family, arising from the development of the socialist society, offer ample opportunities for the satisfactory education of children.¹⁷

Social policy is one of the principal prerequisites; Clara Zetkin listed it as the foundation of good child rearing. The sociopolitical program has greatly eased life, especially for women and their families. Since 1971 housing conditions have improved for more than 4.8 million citizens. The 40-hour week is in effect for some 600,000 mothers of 2 or more children, and such mothers are granted vacations extended by at least 205 days. Since 1975 more than 371,000 women have claimed the paid "baby year" after the birth of their second or subsequent child. Society's concern for mother and child is variously expressed, not least by the extended system of child care facilities now looking after 60 percent of children of creche age and all preschoolers. Realized for the preschoolers thereby also is the principle of linking child rearing in the family with social education.¹⁸

The full involvement of women in professional and social life implies a new quality of the development of the family and family education. The Tenth SED Congress confirmed to all women and girls that they "daily prove anew the great social value of their equality at work, in the family, the education and care of children." Many social efforts aim "to enable the woman as an equal member of the socialist society to cope with her obligations on the job and as a mother."¹⁹

At the 11th DFD /Democratic Women's League of Germany/ Congress, many women talked of their experiences, told us how they handle the combination of professional, social and family obligations. They are able fully to develop their abilities when community of interests and solidarity determine the lives of the partners and the extended sector of the family. Our children have the same experience. Whether such an experience is truly valuable for them, that is an important concern of family education. The report to the congress states: "We now see growing up the first generation of children whose mothers have full equality. The children observe that father and mother go to work, are socially active and not concerned only with the welfare of the family. All of this is bound to have a beneficial effect on the children, but it is incumbent on us to make them aware of it."²⁰

New relationships have evolved in the family, and this is reflected in the SED Program. The partnership relations on the basis of equality, love and respect, and their joint responsibility for bringing up their children to be healthy and vital people and socialist personalities are an element of the developing socialist lifestyle. Mothers and fathers hold the same responsibility for child rearing. Without wishing to diminish the role of the mother, more attention needs to be devoted to the father's involvement in actual child rearing. Not only in the interest of easing the burden on women but most of all in the interest of the children. Here we may again recall Clara Zetkin who wished to see the intellectual and ethical strength of both father and mother to be used for the well-being of the child. "Education should not be up to the mother only but be...the achievement of both parents."²¹

It is the nature of our socialist educational system that child rearing in the family means providing a proper scientific education for all children of the people and bringing them up to be socialist personalities, for the parents to have partners in

first the nursery schools and later the elementary and secondary schools, who train their children in a spirit fully responding to their own interests.

Zetkin repeatedly emphasizes the basic working class concept--that school and family must complement one another. This can now be fully realized within the scope of communist education. The parents involvement in the work of the schools by way of the democratic parent representations has become a firm element of socialist democracy. On the other hand this enhances the duty constantly to devote attention to the textual issues of family education. That applies in particular to the family's share in seeing that children and young people understand "why it is necessary to take up their places at the side of social progress, the side of the working class."²²

The knowledge gained in recent decades about child rearing in the socialist society tells us that the influence on the development of our children's attitude to the basic issues of our age is most important.²³ In addition to the social differentiation of families, pointed out by Artur Meier with great emphasis,²⁴ the stage of development of the parents consciousness varies and affects the education of children with regard to their attitudes to the values of our society. We may assume that the majority of parents consider the educational goals of the socialist society their own and endeavor to rear their children as vital and capable citizens of our country. The hard work and commitment of parents to their jobs, their organization in society are nowadays just as much part of the educationally effective conditions of our lifestyle as are familiarity with culture and education, the organization of leisure.

Zetkin already maintained that, in addition to a pro-family social policy and the development of new family relations, parents must consciously organize education in the family. Precisely in view of the family's share in the education of a good citizen, a morally sound individual of strong character, we must ask ourselves whether enough pedagogical assistance is in fact given the family in these tasks. Here we must keep in mind that education in the family is part of the totality of family life. It proceeds in connection with the organization of everyday life, the experience of festive occasions and also days of anxiety in family life. The many social relations entered upon by the family members among themselves and with persons and collectives outside the family are not only givens of education. They are also models of standards and behavior.

It is the real objective of family education consciously to organize and use these givens in the interest of developing the children's personalities, allowing the children themselves to collaborate actively and meaningfully, and assigning them responsibilities for the collective of the family. Parents often have problems and seek counsel as to how to challenge their children in daily life and induce them to fulfill their daily duties, by doing their school work just as by carrying out the chores assigned them in the family, how in the family to encourage the evolution of attitudes to social issues by the means of mass communication, conversations and art, and how to teach the child to measure its attitude to the challenges of our age. It will, therefore, be necessary also to reflect why the respective efforts by schools and parents are not always successful.

The experience and knowledge of parents who are consciously endeavoring to educate their children as young socialists must be utilized much more for enriching the experiences of pedagogy. They must be included in the development of the theory of

the communist education of the new generation, a theory to which Clara Zetkin has provided an important contribution.

FOOTNOTES

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3. See Rosemarie Walther: "Clara Zetkin zur Proletarischen Familienerziehung" [Clara Zetkin on Proletarian Child Rearing], Volk und Wissen Volkseigener Verlag, Berlin 1959.
4. See Clara Zetkin: "Ueber Jugenderziehung" [On the Education of Youth], Dietz Verlag, Berlin 1957, pp 47-90.
5. See Gerd Hohendorf: "Revolutionaere Schulpolitik und Marxistische Paedagogik im Lebenswerk Clara Zetkins" [Revolutionary Educational Policy and Marxist Pedagogy in Clara Zetkin's Life's Work], Volk und Wissen Volkseigener Verlag, Berlin 1962; Clara Zetkin; Kaete Duncker; I. Borchardt: "Die Erziehung der Kinder in der Proletarischen Familie. Ausgewaehlt, Eingeleitet und Erlaeutert von G. Hohendorf" [The Education of Children in the Proletarian Family. Selected, Introduced and Commented by G. Hohendorf], Volk und Wissen Volkseigener Verlag, Berlin 1960.
6. Karl Marx/Friedrich Engels: Collected Works, Vol 4, Dietz Verlag, Berlin 1977, p 478.
7. See Gerd Hohendorf, as before, p 56.
8. See August Bebel: "Die Frau und der Sozialismus" [Women and Socialism], Dietz Verlag, Berlin 1950, p 557.
9. Clara Zetkin: "On the Education of Youth," as before, p 44.
10. Ibid, p 80.
11. Ibid, p 57.
12. Ibid, p 66.
13. Maxim Zetkin: "Clara Zetkin as Home Educator," "Jahrbuch fuer Erziehungs- und Schulgeschichte" [Education and School History Annual], Vol 3, Akademie Verlag, Berlin 1963, p 238.
14. Clara Zetkin: "On the Education of Youth," as before, p 68.
15. Ibid, p 69.

16. See Clara Zetkin: "Selected Speeches...", as before, Vol 3.
17. See "Discussion on the Higher Standard of the Communist Education of School Children with Contributions on Family Education by R. Froehlich, M. Mitzenheim, E. Scharnhorst, H. Streich and R. Walther," PAEDAGOGIK, No 9/1981, pp 718 ff.
18. See Ilse Thiele: "League Executive Report to the 11th DFD Congress Berlin 1982," BULLETIN 1, pp 7f.
19. Erich Honecker: "Bericht des Zentralkomitees an den X. Parteitag der SED" /Central Committee Report to the Tenth SED Congress/, Dietz Verlag, Berlin 1981, p 121.
20. Ilse Thiele: "League Executive Report...", as before, p 19.
21. Clara Zetkin: "On the Education of Youth," as before, p 69.
22. Kurt Hager: "The Socialist School in the Struggles of Our Age," BERLINER ZEITUNG, 12 May 1982, p 3.
23. See Alla M. Nisowa/Erna Scharnhorst/Rosemarie Walther: "Zur Politischen und Moralischen Erziehung in der Familie" /On the Political and Ethical Education in the Family/, Volk und Wissen Volkseigener Verlag, Berlin 1979.
24. See Artur Meier: "Lebensbedingungen und Lebensweise von Schuljugendlichen" /Living Conditions and Lifestyle of School Children/, Vol III, GDR Academy of Pedagogical Sciences, 1980, p 319.

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U.S. FOREIGN POLICY CONSERVATISM DISCUSSED

Warsaw SPRAWY MIĘDZYNARÓDOWE in Polish No 10, Oct 81 (signed to press Mar 82)
pp 23-36

[Article by Longin Pastusiak, professor at the Institute for Research on Contemporary Problems of Capitalism]

[Text] Platform of President Reagan

Ronald Reagan gained the opinion as the first president of the United States, in a half century, to implement the program proclaimed in the election campaign. The last president to fulfill his campaign promises was Franklin Delano Roosevelt. Earlier and later, American election practices have revealed that there exists a rather loose relationship between the campaign program of the victorious candidate for president, and the fulfillment of his domestic and foreign policies after taking office.

Consequently, not only American but foreign commentators, generally have not attached much significance to the views expressed by presidential candidates during the election campaign, maintaining that the actual policies will not be determined until after the elections. In the meantime Ronald Reagan, during the initial months of his presidency, began to implement with great consistency his pre-election views regarding domestic, as well as foreign policies. For example, in the domestic sphere, he criticized the stagnation of the American economy, and proposed a conservative program to resolve the domestic problems of the U.S., which included among other things: a reduction in government control of the economy, and in general, of the domestic life of the country; limitation on budget spending, especially for social purposes; observance of the principle of a federally-balanced budget, as well as greater control over the money supply. Reagan, furthermore, demanded that the value of the dollar be stabilized. The government--in Reagan's opinion--should create incentives for business in the direction of developing the production of energy in the U.S. to solve the energy crisis. Reagan also favored a significant reduction in taxes for private individuals, as well as corporations; as a means of stimulating the American economy.

During the course of several months of his administration, Reagan in fulfilling these campaign promises, lowered taxes; reduced expenditures for social purposes; reduced government personnel; limited government interference,

especially in economic matters; improved the position of the dollar in the international monetary system. This is relatively much for being in office only 8 months. At least to date, the campaign promise that his administration would concentrate, above all, on the settling of domestic issues in the United States, has been confirmed.

In the field of foreign policy, however, R. Reagan presented a program filled with generalities and demagoguery. For example, he charged the incumbent president, Jimmy Carter, of permitting the USSR to gain superiority over the United States in every aspect of defense; and by his campaign on the issue of human rights, of alienating "traditional allies and friends" of the U.S. He described the foreign policy of the Carter administration as a policy of "appeasement and futility."¹ "An effective U.S. foreign policy could serve to restore--according to Reagan--faith in the 'future of America'; in the free-market economy and in the ability to maintain world peace and assure our national security."

Reagan insisted on the intensification of the conveyance abroad of American propaganda by, among others, The Voice of America, Radio Free Europe and Liberty. He accused Carter of "neglecting" the U.S. arms expansion potential. He supported the production of the B-1 strategic bomber, the "Trident" submarines, neutron weapons, MX missiles, as well as Cruise missiles. He demanded a larger increase in arms expenditures; he opposed ratification of SALT II Treaty, and insisted on the commitment of more resources to armaments by U.S. allies. "We must maintain a superior naval force, and this requires the construction of new ships and technological development which will make it possible for the United States to dominate the seas over the next several decades."²

Reagan declared himself in favor of closer cooperation between the three nations situated on the North American continent: the United States, Canada and Mexico. Hence, it is not accidental that he made his first visits abroad to exactly these countries following his victorious election. In his election campaign, he supported maintenance and development of contacts with China, as well as with Taiwan.

He also opposed all attempts to bring pressure on Israel, designated by him as "a strategic ponderable bargaining chip, which with its highly trained army stands as a powerful deterrent to Soviet expansion in this troubled region of the world."³ He was critical of Carter for deserting the Shah of Iran when the Shah "found himself in a difficult situation." In addition, he charged Carter with the failure to assume the role as leader of the capitalist world. "We have not striven to accept the leadership of the free world, but no one besides us is in a position to provide it. Without our leadership there can be no world peace."⁴ This opinion represents its type of attempt at demagoguery in Reagan's program of nationalism. It is no wonder then, that his opponents accused Reagan of lacking experience in foreign policy, and in the U.S. it was stated that his program is dangerous and could rapidly involve the United States in a local or even global war.⁵

Circumstances Surrounding the Ascent to Power

The results of the presidential election were acknowledged as a definite termination of the post-Vietnam era in the U.S., especially the U.S. foreign policy; as an end to holding the Republicans responsible for the scandals and affairs of the Nixon era, and above all the Watergate affair; as clear evidence of a shift in social attitudes in the direction of conservatism; as an indication of increased national pride and greater willingness in the firm defense of American interests in the world.

What were the reasons for the spectacular success of Reagan's campaign and his party? The reasons are many and they should be treated jointly and not arbitrarily. The following are the most significant:

--the reaction of the American public to the crisis and unfavorable trends which were inflicted upon the United States in the decade of the 1970's (the defeat in Vietnam, the Watergate affair and other scandals, the recession, inflation; the weakening of American leadership in the capitalistic world, the inability to win the strategic race with the USSR, and the like);

--the relative weakening of the U.S. position in influencing international [affairs] as well as in the influencing of the capitalistic world. (Reaction from the right wing: to regain status through intensive armament);

--the consolidation in the U.S. of the phenomenon called the "new nationalism" or the "new patriotism," the growth of national pride and the demand for a more aggressive defense of American interests in selected regions of the world;

--an increase of social conviction and feeling that the United States is heading for the worse. The collapse of the traditional social optimism. A dominant conviction that the past was better than the present, and that the present is better than the future. This supplied the background for the program's support which postulated "solid conservative renovation";

--the crisis in the liberal body politic and the liberal doctrines, which, as became evident, are not in a position to solve the problems tormenting the American public. The American version of the concept of the "state of well-being" or the "welfare state," disillusioned those who awaited such aid and those who were opposed to it. The more affluent strata regarded the social welfare program as a waste of resources and a source of inflation;

--Carter's political fiascos on many fronts. The weakness of the Carter administration was Reagan's bargaining chip. The failure of the Carter administration to fulfill many campaign promises, the irresolution and inconsistencies in the policies he conducted discouraged significant segments of the electorate.

The circumstances which were conducive to Reagan's ascent to power are to a certain degree the determinants of the foreign policy of the Reagan administration.

The forces which elevated Reagan to power, the circles with which he is most closely affiliated, are not the ones whose interests lie, above all, beyond the U.S. borders. This does not imply that Reagan and his associates underestimate the need for strengthening United States positions abroad. However, they realize that the United States can increase the intensity of its internal influence on allies and adversaries; can regain prestige and political leadership in the Western world, only then, when it settles its internal issues. In the opinion of Reagan's team a healthy economy, a strong dollar, a stable social state of affairs in conjunction with an adequate military force provide the United States with a bargaining chip in the international arena of operations and enhance the prestige of the country and respect for America. In addition a decisive leadership is necessary, a "leadership" which Reagan feels is represented by his own person as contrasted with the wavering and indecisive performance of his predecessor. Hence, the tough language and rhetoric in the statements of Reagan and his team.

For this reason, during the initial months of activity of the Reagan administration, foreign issues were decidedly relegated to second place. Already on his Inauguration Day, January 20, 1981, in his inaugural address, the 40th President of the United States dedicated two-thirds of his text to domestic issues. He at that time affirmed and announced the continuation of his conservative program. On foreign issues he confined himself to generalities such as, "peace is the greatest aspiration of the American people," adding, "we shall strive for this goal, provide dedication..., but we shall not yield, now or ever." He warned the world not to interpret American "moderation" as an indication of weakness. He also called for intensive armaments.

Conservatism in Foreign Policy

Conservative attitudes dominate the United States. It is believed that conservative thought will dominate domestic, as well as foreign policy in the near future. The question should be raised as to what influence this contemporary American conservatism will have on foreign and military policy. The answer to this question is, however, not an easy one because the contemporary American conservatism is not a consistent phenomenon. Various conservative groups hold fixed opinions on domestic issues, and hence on the social and economic policies, and the role of the mechanics of government, but their positions vary significantly on foreign matters. American conservatism thrives principally on domestic issues and manifests itself most clearly at local and state levels; more weakly at the national, and most weakly at the international levels.

One of the leading theorists on contemporary American conservatism, Irving Kristol, of the American Enterprise Institute, when questioned as to why the conservatives, in spite of the immense resources at their disposal, as well as the intellectual potential which they have gathered unto themselves, were not in a position to date to present a compact, concrete and comprehensive policy on foreign issues, replied as follows:

"Frankly speaking, the preparation of a new and compact foreign policy is not an easy matter. It is not difficult to express anti-communistic and

"anti-soviet attitudes, but it is not easy to answer the question as to what we should do when the Russians invade Poland, or what are we doing in Salvador or the Near East.

"We must begin to create that which we never had in this country: an intellectual concept of foreign policy. The conservative concept of foreign policy during prior decades has constantly changed courses, from isolationism to the 'containment of communism,' to the limited escapade of John Foster Dulles called emancipation; subsequently to the return of containment, quasi-isolationism, detente and eventually anti-detente.

"The truth is this: the liberal concept of foreign policy is crumbling and the conservatives have not devised anything. However, the republicans as a whole have never attached great significance to foreign policy.

"Many people can make a large contribution in the development of conservatism in foreign policy. We hear more and more frequently about groups of young people, analysts of foreign policy, who have made their appearance during the course of the past 10 years. Many of them presently have a seat in the National Security Council and in the Department of State, although it is unfortunate that they sit there. Being on the outside they could most likely exercise greater influence on the development of conservative ideas in foreign policy through publications and propagation of ideas."6

After all, it is not by chance, that the traditional and most influential brain trusts; the research centers in the sphere of international relations, such as the Council of Foreign Relations, Brookings Institution or even the numerous university centers maintained the opinion of the liberals and possibly the moderates in the full American sense of the word. The conservative "brain trusts" in the sphere of foreign policy have only recently exercised influence on the decision centers in Washington, D.C.

The most important conservative research centers closely related to the Reagan administration, and specializing in foreign matters consist of the following:

1. The Hoover Institution in California. Ronald Reagan is an honorary member of this institute. Twenty-five scholars from this center were represented on Reagan's campaign staff, and several of them occupy influential posts in his administration.
2. The American Enterprise Institute in Washington, D.C. It is a large, outstanding research center, which is only partially occupied with foreign issues. It publishes numerous books, periodicals; organizes conferences and seminars. Its budget amounts to 10 million dollars annually.
3. The Center for Strategic and International Studies at Georgetown University was established in 1971. Among others, Henry Kissinger, Zbigniew Brzezinski and many conservative policy experts work here. Its specialty is the study of long-range political strategy.

4. The American Security Council, located in Culpepper, Virginia, is the principal organizer in the U.S. of the renowned campaign, "Peace Through Strength." Among others conducting seminars at this center was Alexander Haig.

5. The Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis in Cambridge, Massachusetts, with a branch office in Washington, D.C., not only specializes in foreign affairs, but also the study of United States military policy concepts. The weekly U.S. NEWS AND WORLD REPORT disclosed that the ideas studied by this center relative to manned bombers and the Rapid Deployment Force are closely read in the White House and Pentagon.⁷

Eugene Rostow maintains that "foreign policy does not create divisions between liberals and conservatives. There is no such term as a liberal or conservative foreign policy." In a certain sense Rostow is justified, if his reference is to the past. U.S. foreign policy was not traditionally the fundamental subject of controversy between the liberals and the conservatives. The American liberals were not less anti-communist than the conservatives. And even if the conservatives differ little from the liberals in this case, the conservative concept of foreign policy is gradually beginning to crystallize with increasing distinctness.

The American conservatives agree that detente should not be the main determinant governing the attitude of the United States toward its chief adversary, namely, as viewed through the eyes of the advocates of conservative philosophy, the Soviet Union. However, they maintain that the alternative to detente is not cold war, nor confrontation with the USSR, nor nuclear war; but rather the development of the military might of the United States and its allies, and the firm defense of the system of values of the capitalistic world, in view of the increasing, as is claimed, abuse on the part of the Soviet Union. The conservatives do not deny that there are areas for Soviet-American cooperation and a similarity of interests on the part of both powers. They claim, however, that these do not represent any basis for building confidence in the Soviet Union or the communist system as a whole. They reject the view, strongly publicized during the period of detente, that by involving the Socialist countries, including the Soviet Union in a network of various treaties and agreements including economic, political, cultural and scientific cooperation, it would lead to the liberalization of the USSR and the socialist system as a whole. They emphasize that actually during the period of detente, the dissident movement in the USSR was broken and subjected to control. Moreover, they likewise reject the argument that East-West trade leads to the growth of economic and political interdependence of the Soviet Union on the West. If such interdependence took place then, the West rather became more dependent than the East--so states the conservative mentality.

The conservatives maintain that the West paid for detente with a weakening in its military potential; with an alleged renouncement of its most precious capitalistic values; as well as with a disintegration of Atlantic Alliance integrality and other allied agreements. They also advance the argument, although it is not clearly formulated, that detente hinders the exercise of

iron control by Washington over its allies. Detente blunted the sharp criticism of communism, at a time when the Soviet Union was increasing its ideological offensive against the West. Expansionism is one of the principal accusations advanced by the conservatives against the USSR. Of importance here is the deepening distrust of the Soviet Union; the hostile attitude toward Soviet foreign policy of not only American but of international opinion as well.

"The Soviet Union creates something more than just a military threat which can be challenged by the traditional policy of the balance of power. The threat is not ideological in the sense that the Soviet Union continuously strives to expand its power through the aid of all possible political resources; by penetrating massive organizations, such as political parties, trade unions, organizations comprised of writers, artists, journalists, sportsmen and many others, which can be exploited for propaganda or political purposes. The ideological struggle waged by Moscow is not the struggle of abstract ideas, but is a challenge to the entire democratic civilization."⁹

One frequently encounters the charge, advanced by the American liberals, that the American conservatism of today is not sufficiently anti-communist and underestimates the ideological threat from the direction of the Soviet Union. This view was argued among others by Paul Weyrich, the chief proponent of the new American right-wing, who charged that the liberals, in attempting to outperform the conservatives as anti-communists are thereby appealing to the current conservative mood of the American public.¹⁰

The conservatives, and particularly the Christian element, is unscrupulous in its violent verbal attacks on the USSR, communism and socialism. Gary Jarmin, an activist in a conservative organization called Christian Voice, and who considers himself to be a "professional conservative," says: "In our opinion the world is divided into two camps: God and Satan. It is not a struggle between Keynes and Friedman; between liberals and conservatives, but a struggle between good and evil." He classifies his outlook on communist matters clearly and directly: "No compromise. The only moral foreign policy which the United States can follow is a policy which advocates the total destruction of communism and the liberation of all under its domination. The goal of our policy should be the liberation of Poland.... In 1956 we should have, in my opinion, liberated that country, and by so doing started a chain reaction in Eastern Europe. I am convinced that we likewise missed a great opportunity in Korea."¹¹

Conservatism is distrusting and suspicious with reference not only to disarmament, but likewise to any agreements whatsoever in the area of arms control. During the period of detente--it is stated--no significant agreement was reached on arms control; instead confusion reigned in the minds of Americans; prejudicing them against arms expenditures, and "undermining" public opinion on these events. At the same time the Soviet Union--the conservatives claim--was arming itself intensively, and beyond need.

Contemporary conservatives--as compared with conservatives of more than a quarter century ago--are beginning to draw differences between the different

communisms. It is not by chance that they concentrate their attention chiefly on the Soviet Union. In the meantime, less is said about the other socialistic countries. Their objective is the broadening of the deviations among the socialistic countries and the support of that foreign policy which exploits and broadens these deviations. This above all refers to the policy towards China and the Soviet-China deviations; the policy towards socialist European countries; the hostile attitude towards other socialist countries, such as Cuba, Vietnam, Kampuchea, etc. The present-day conservatives favor a discriminatory approach toward the socialist countries. In the sense that they grant themselves certain limits of support regarding those Socialist countries which Washington is prepared to support for practical purposes (for example China). It can be said that contemporary conservatives bear the traits of strong anti-sovietism.

The conservatives are highly distrustful of the Peoples Republic of China (PRC). They are opposed to strengthening China, but at the same time wish to take advantage of the anti-Soviet attitude of China to weaken the Soviet Union. In connection with this, they advocate the development of relations with Taiwan and oppose an American-Chinese alliance; while in the meantime they campaign for the creation of certain incentives (for example a supply of certain types of arms) to exploit Chinese anti-USSR position.

The attitude of American conservatism towards the "third world" is one of great suspicion. Quite frequently the conservatives made references to the possibility of transforming the developing countries into capitalistic structured nations, which will hopefully copy capitalistic solutions to their economy and social policies. The conservatives are concerned about the existing socio-political discrimination in the "third world" from the standpoint that it is impossible to reverse progressive changes in the non-capitalistic solutions adopted by many of these countries. For this reason they demand a limit on the supply of economic aid, which in their estimation, brings the United States only economic losses and represents political "waste."

That the conservatives are not political idealists is evidenced by their attitude toward human rights, and the role of human rights as an instrument of United States foreign policy. Many conservatives attach greater significance to the loyalty and dependence on the United States of certain countries than to the system of values, or respect for rights and liberties even in the American sense of the word. The conservatives charged that Carter's attitude toward human rights was overly idealistic and led to a deterioration of the United States' relations with friendly and loyal countries, such as the Latin-American dictatorships, the Republic of South Africa (SAR), South Korea and Iran during the Shah's reign, etc. Herein lies the whole hypocrisy of the conservatives, who more highly regard the faithfulness and loyalty of the dictatorial regimes, than the exertion of influence to bring about freedom and liberty, which the conservatives eagerly perorate.

American conservatism often identifies with nationalism and often even borders on chauvenism. This was especially evident during the struggle for the ratification of the Panama Canal treaty signed by President Carter. This treaty, which in perspective increased the role of Panama in the management zone of

the canal was bitterly contested by the conservative organizations and regarded by them as an obvious sell-out of interests and American possessions.

Conservatism in Military Policy

The conservatives differ with the establishment, that a negotiated understanding regarding arms control cannot under any circumstance constitute a substitute for the building of a strong military potential and an expanded comprehensive military strategy. They regard it as naive, the belief that disarmament agreements or arms control agreements can regulate relations between two opposing and antagonistic powers. During the period of detente, it was observed that one of the fruits in the improvement of political relations between the United States and the USSR would be a series of understandings in the area of arms control. But it did not happen that way. Instead a series of events unfavorable to the interests of America followed, which, according to the conservatives, concealed the direct inspiration of the USSR and the socialist countries. Incidental to these events, the conservatives most frequently mention the war in the Near East of October 1973; the victory of the uprising for national liberation in Angola in 1975; and the invasion of Afghanistan by the soviet army in December of 1979. The issue of Afghanistan is presented by the conservatives as the reason for the non-ratification of the SALT II treaty limiting strategic arms by the American Administration and the Senate of the United States. This does not coincide with the facts. Conservatism strengthened its position in the United States for several years due to the invasion of Afghanistan by the soviet army. An attack by the conservative forces on the foreign policy of the United States Government immediately followed the signing of the CSCE Final Act in 1975 in Helsinki. The Carter administration for no greater reason delayed negotiations on SALT II, and when finally it decided to sign the treaty in June of 1979, the conservative opposition was already so consolidated that Carter failed to obtain 67 votes in the Senate necessary to ratify the treaty. A refusal to ratify would, however, make the United States in the eyes of the world responsible for the arms race, and this the American establishment wished to avoid. Carter, hence, used Afghanistan as a pretext for removing the SALT II treaty from the Senate daily agenda to the satisfaction of the American conservatives. In the following session of the Senate, which began its work in 1981, the opponents of the treaty strengthened their position even more so.

The conservatives presently attack many of the concepts which dominated American military minds and the U.S. military doctrine since the 1960's. American nuclear doctrine for many years is supported by the theory of deterrence, frequently referred to as "mutual assured destruction." In conformity with this concept, the stability of Soviet-American strategic nuclear balance requires that both powers be assured of the ability to destroy the opponent even if it is attacked first. The possession of certain and safe capabilities for a second strategic nuclear strike, is linked to the possession of considerable no-warning nuclear power, in the event of a surprise enemy attack; as well as the lack of such defense systems by the opposite side which

could prevent the penetration of its air space by the retaliatory force of the country suffering the surprise attack.

To date, the U.S. has announced that in these matters there exists a reciprocal and mutual understanding between the Soviet Union and the United States.

The conservatives attacked these concepts which in fact signify definite arms stabilization and began to seek means of convincing public opinion of the need to support a program of intensive arms development. In this respect, the conservative interest provided a veneer for the interests of the American military-industrial complex. The year 1975 marked the beginning of a long, preparatory propaganda campaign meant to last several years. Its principal goal was to increase distrust in the Soviet Union and to level the opposition of American public opinion to the increase in arms expenditures. Up to 1978, the majority of Americans still opposed an increase in the Pentagon budget. A propaganda campaign was well financed and organized. It was announced that the Soviet Union allegedly arms itself beyond need, allocating huge sums for the defense of the country against a surprise nuclear attack. The United States--it was held--does nothing in this area and in this situation will not be capable of a second strategic strike; the entire American concept of "deterrence" therefore, loses value.

The conservatives stressed that the USSR systematically modernizes its strategic capabilities, rendering them precise and effective; that it develops efficient defense systems around its cities, thus making impossible the launching of a retaliatory nuclear attack by the United States on Soviet urban centers from submarines.

The conservative brain trusts in the U.S. hence evermore forcefully, began to undermine the fundamental principles of the American strategic concept. Yet it is necessary to wait for the final effect of this revalorization of the American strategy. Certain tendencies have, however, already appeared. The first step involves the greater immunization of American strategic capabilities against destruction by the enemy by constructing, among other things, a system of MX mobile missiles on land, on sea or in the air. This is an unusually expensive program that could consume even more than 50 billion dollars. There is mention of an increase in the number of "Minuteman" intercontinental missiles, in order to increase the number of destroyable targets on enemy territory. The conservatives advocate a country-wide program of mass civil defense, modernization of air defense, as well as the construction of many anti-missile systems; formerly waived in accordance with the Soviet-American agreement, around key cities and strategic U.S. centers.

Presently divergent opinions regarding ultimate objectives prevail among the conservatives. Many of them voice the opinion that the United States should strive to gain strategic superiority over the Soviet Union, and makes no secret of all of this highly dangerous view. Others urge the attainment of strategic "parity" with the USSR, and a change for the better in the strategic position of the U.S. in its relations with the Soviet Union. Many conservatives are of the opinion that the achievement of strategic superiority over the USSR is not only possible, but simply desirable. Some claim that

this is desirable; yet others claim that it is desirable but too costly, even for the United States.

In the United States, and in particularly in conservative circles, the conviction that armaments are a greater burden on the economy of the socialist countries than on the capitalistic, is gaining in strength. In conjunction with this, the socialist nations should be drawn into an intensive arms race; thereby weakening the economic and political systems of those nations. Upon being compelled to assign larger resources to armaments, the governments of the socialist nations will be in no position to carry out economic and social programs, and this will create social tension in those countries and lead to the weakening if not the collapse of the socialist system. This reasoning appeared in the United States some time ago, but it was never so close to the ruling circles in Washington, D.C., as at present. Intense armaments, coinciding with such reasoning, represent a desired goal not only from a purely military point of view, but also from the point of view of higher political justification.

A dangerous phenomenon in the reasoning of the conservatives, is likewise the promotion of opinions regarding the possibility of initiating, conducting, as well as winning a limited nuclear war with the Soviet Union or any other nation. This view, frequently raised in conservative circles, is intended to acquaint the public with nuclear warfare, and to convince society that limited atomic warfare in essence does not differ from conventional warfare, and can even be more effective and shorter, and speculatively "more humanitarian."

The conservatives occasionally criticize even the Reagan military policy. For example, the influential and unusually active conservative center specializing in the analysis of economic and military policy, the Heritage Foundation (founded in 1974), criticized the Reagan administration in the summer of 1981 for its failure to recommend a comprehensive and long range program to utilize the funds provided by Congress for military purposes.

Conservatives are of the opinion that the United States allies underestimate the alleged soviet threat to the capitalistic world, and conduct an overly soft and overly conciliatory policy towards the USSR. They insist that Japan and the NATO countries increase their outlays for military purposes. On the other hand, they state that Washington will strive to exercise its role as leader more effectively in its military alliances; while on the other, it pressures its allies to generate their own domestic policy in harmony, however, with the political goals of the United States. This is especially evident in the application of American pressures exerted on Japan.

Conservatism in Foreign Economic Policy

During the greater part of the post-war years, no essential differences were reflected in the views of either the Democratic or Republican party on issues regarding foreign economic policy. Harmony prevailed, inasmuch as it is the function of this policy to create the most favorable conditions for the expansion of American capital; while its political objective--is the strengthening

of the capitalistic system and the restraint of communism. Even some of the advocates of isolationism and protectionism of that period participated unopposed in conducting the so conceived foreign economic policy. The relative stability of the prevailing American economy facilitated the government's ability to gain a consensus in the foreign economic policy.

This consensus, however, began to collapse together with the weakening of: the United States' standing in the power structure of world capitalism; the decline in the value of the dollar; the rise in inflation in the United States; and the decline in the growth rate of labor production. In the meantime, views surrounding the solution of these problems began to intensify. The conservatives accused the government of excessive interference in economic matters, and demanded a program of deregulation, or relaxation in legal restrictions, standards, requirements (in the sphere of community protection, consumer interests, etc.) established as a result of social pressure by the federal authorities and Congress.

The conservatives oppose the coordination of economic relations of developed capitalistic countries.

They advocate free power play in international markets which will bring numerous advantages to the United States as the most powerful economic organization in the world. The conservatives attach greater significance, for example, to the monetary policy; to strengthening the money and stabilizing prices as instruments for providing economic cures. By taking this route--they claim--international confidence in the dollar will be restored, and perhaps even the conversion of the dollar for gold. The American currency lost this conversion in August of 1971. The conservative school strives for the stabilization of the international monetary system, but opposes the intervention of governments in the matter of currency exchange rates, noting that free power play should be permitted in this area, even though it is known that free power play is completely a fiction in the monetary policy of the capitalistic nations. The American conservatives insist that the remaining capitalistic countries abolish the barriers impeding the free flow of capital, such as, for example, the control of exchange rates; the control of the inflow of foreign capital, and likewise the tax system regulating the flow of capital.

The conservatives consider themselves the defenders of free market play. They oppose trade barriers; the multinational sources utilized by a country for the promotion of its own exports; and likewise the protectionist sources within the United States, although some of them devote more attention to fighting protectionism in other countries than in the United States itself.

Conservatives are basically opposed to providing foreign economic aid. However, they support military aid programs, especially to the ultra right-wing dictatorial regimes. They are prepared to support only that economic aid which will facilitate the influx of American capital into the developing countries, or will also serve to strengthen the capitalistic way of developing these countries. They are adverse to proposals included in the international economic order which forecast a coordinated policy of economic intervention in the developing countries.

The conservative position is found to be clearly inconsistent. On the one hand they demonstrate their objection to governmental interference in the domestic and international market; but on the other hand--they insist that the American Government and the government of other capitalistic nations apply the leverage of economic pressure in a more effective and firm manner, for example, on socialist countries, or nations of the "third world" in order to achieve specific political goals. This inconsistency likewise appears in the appeals of conservative organizations for closer coordination in the foreign economic policy of the United States with political and military goals.

Inasmuch as many conservative trends currently pervade the United States (the total number of conservative institutions is estimated at about one thousand), they are often classified under the collective label of neo-conservatism. "The neo-conservative comprehension of foreign policy problems emerges from the establishment's 'growth in the complexity of world policy' and 'the crisis of the old world order' (D. Bell). From thence the new international state of affairs, which is associated, in the opinion of the neo-conservatives, in the first place--with the appearance of the developing countries on the international political scene, and in the second place--with the emergence of problems in international policy which cannot be resolved by traditional methods of bourgeois diplomacy. A general evaluation of the state of affairs in itself bears pessimistic tones; because the ideologists of neo-conservatism realize that basic shifts took place in the system of international relations in the 1970's, as a result of which the United States was deprived of its previous position of privilege. However, as a result of its social and class limitations, neo-conservatism is in no position to perceive and clarify the real cause of the occurring shifts--above all the attainment of nuclear equilibrium between the USSR and the United States, as well as the growth of the power of the countries in the socialist community."¹²

Many moves of the present American government originate in the conservative school. After all, there is no doubt that Reagan's administration is the most conservative government in the United States of more than one-half century; that is, since the time of Herbert Hoover's presidency (1929-1933).

The conservative characteristics of the policy of the Reagan administration can be clearly detected in the internal economic and social policy, as well as in the foreign and military policy. Apropos of military policy we are dealing with a program of arms capability development unprecedented in the peace-time history of the United States. This program faces expenditures of 1.5 billion dollars for the years 1982-1986. More than half of all Americans believe, that thanks to this, the United States will be in a position to gain military superiority over the Soviet Union. A yet more significant percentage (up to 64 percent of all Americans) supports an increase in arms expenditures, while only 29 percent are opposed to this.¹³

In the sphere of foreign policy, the conservative character of the Reagan policy is most evident in the case of Washington's policy toward the Soviet Union and East-West relations.

Apropos of East-West relations, and particularly Soviet-American relations, the Reagan administration, during the course of the first eight months in office had practically nothing constructive to offer. The people presently in the White House camp create the impression that they would like to talk with the Soviet Union from a position of superiority, and not strategic parity. Sooner or later the Reagan administration will, however, have to prepare a detailed program of foreign policy; and in it likewise a program to solve the problems proceeding from the current tension in East-West relations.

The Soviet opinion of the Reagan camp and the policy of the present administration is harsh and very critical. Washington has displayed no interest in the numerous proposals which the Soviet Union submitted in 1981 in the sphere of arms control and improvement of East-West relations and Soviet-American relations. The Soviet Union has reason to suspect that the chief goal of Washington is the achievement of military superiority over the USSR.¹⁴ In a lengthy editorial article, PRAVDA accused the United States not only of anti-sovietism, but of attempting to create an anti-socialist coalition of a global scale. "The imperialistic powers, and the United States above all others, obstinately seek to suppress the world revolutionary process; to turn the tide of history. Washington, more and more clearly manifests its imperialistic ambitions, fomenting the scandalous myth about the soviet military threat, the strategists in Washington seek to create, under their own guidance, some sort of world anti-socialist coalition, feverishly strengthen the arms race aspiring to obtain military superiority over the Soviet Union and its allies."¹⁵

FOOTNOTES

1. R. Reagan: "Need for U.S. Reliability Abroad." INTERNATIONAL HERALD TRIBUNE, May 9, 1980.
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3. Ibid.
4. Ibid.
5. U.S. NEWS AND WORLD REPORT, May 5, 1981, p 31.
6. Interview with Irving Kristol, "Authority on Politican Trends," U.S. NEWS AND WORLD REPORT, July 20, 1981, p 50.
7. U.S. NEWS AND WORLD REPORT, July 20, 1981.
8. "Objections to Conservatism." "The Heritage Lectures," 1981, no 3, p 27.
9. Ibid, p 28.
10. Ibid, p 44-45.

11. S. Klaidman: "Foreign Policy as a Morality Play." INTERNATIONAL HERALD TRIBUNE, September 17, 1980.
12. A Mevil: "The Ideology of American Conservatism: Traditions and Contemporary Forms." VOPROSY FILOSOFII, 1979, No 5.
13. NEWSWEEK, June 8, 1981, p 10, 13.
14. V. Zagladin, L. Zamyatin, General V. Starodubov. PEOPLES TRIBUNE, August 25, August 28 and September 3, 1981.
15. PRAVDA, September 2, 1981.

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POLEMICS IN LITERARY SPHERE CONTINUE

Paunescu Attacks Tudor's Review

Bucharest ROMANIA LIBERA in Romanian 9 Jun 82 p 2

[Article by Adrian Paunescu]

[Text] I feel no need whatever, in order to live, for others around me to disappear. But it is my impression that the habit of putting out their neighbor's lamps so that theirs alone will shine has taken deep roots in some. In all the literature I have read and in all the biographies of men of letters I have read I do not think there has ever been a time when one or another has demanded the expulsion of one or another from cultural life so frequently, so consistently and so reprehensibly, when some literary colleagues, or I would rather say, some cultural colleagues seize an opportunity, find a way to the public or an authority, and demand the finish of other literary or cultural colleagues. Their favorite rhetorical question is "How was it possible to defend something like that?" And their favorite animal is their neighbor's dead goat.

A few years ago polemics broke out between Eugen Barbu and Marin Sorescu. I believe polemics are part of the charm of literature. But what surprised me in both of them in turn was their effort to avoid each other and their pleasure in being without an interlocutor. To be very exact, I must say that Barbu was the first to attack. I answered him in Sorescu's defense a few days after he attacked Sorescu's book "In the Lilacs." I did not think Barbu's attack was justified. After that Sorescu lay in wait for Barbu and when "Incognito" was published we all know what happened: an episode that showed us that annihilation of a writer is not good even if it is on true grounds of a mistake made at some point by that writer. And the day before yesterday an article of rare violence and uncommonly bad literary taste by Corneliu Vadim Tudor was published in SAPTAMINA. Personally I have no quarrel with the author of the article, although I hear that he slanders me on every occasion, imitates me and caricaturizes me both intentionally and unintentionally sometimes in real life and sometimes in writing. I would have been tempted to thank him for mentioning me in the said article among good and worthy writers. I did not do so because I do not like that tone of assassination and the attempt to destroy writers' lives and careers, and especially those of two of them, namely Norman Manea and Marin Sorescu. I have also

criticized Norman Manea for an interview, but it seems to me there is a moral distinction between criticizing and claiming a colleague's books should not be published like that between fencing and attempted murder. The first thing I wonder is just what in C. V. Tudor's previous experience qualifies him as a judge of writers and literature? But let us say that we can take him seriously. Our culture has developed institutions more or less prepared to assess new works and to decide what should be published. To be sure mistakes are made but in what field are they not and in what field has it been customary for people to behave like wolves. No one in the whole history of the world's true culture has ever claimed that the person he did not like should disappear from the intellectual scene. Tolerance is characteristic of men of intellect and intolerance ultimately reflects upon those who practice it. I approve of any kind of criticism, however harsh, but I do not agree with assassinations and blows below the belt in the name of principles that are noble to be sure but should be correctly applied. Let us say that we have really competent publishing houses today, despite all the troubles and rejections. I do not ask them to abandon the principles of humanism (How could I?). On the contrary I plead for complete and indiscriminating application of the profoundly humanistic ideological principles of the RCP, which are opposed in themselves to any injustice.

Eugen Barbu's excellent book "Week of Lunatics" was published not long ago, and I take every occasion to speak of it as I speak of all that great writer's good books, like "The Pit," "The Prince," or "The Sunday Dinner." It seemed to me that some critics tend to minimize that book and to discredit it in the readers' eyes. Then I leaped to Eugen Barbu's defense. Now I feel the need to side against what is going on in the journal managed by Eugen Barbu, deforming the literary and moral image of a writer who must and does exist, namely Norman Manea, whom the author of the article, Corneliu Vadim Tudor (who is also the author of many blunders, some of them with serious consequences for the cultural world in general and for Eugen Barbu in particular), is now judging in the same unfair way, I feel, as Barbu was judged by the notable critic N. Manolescu for example in his review of "Week of Lunatics." But let C. V. Tudor turn to the book "Week of Lunatics" and let him judge it in the same falsely purist and so-called intransigent way in which he judges Norman Manea. Let him apply the same criteria to some scenes in this book of Eugen Barbu's. What results will he obtain? Deploable ones, as in the case of Norman Manea. Of course I do not equate Barbu and Manea, but neither can I deny Norman Manea's right to believe he will be an important writer, if he actually is not one. I am not an informed reader of his books but a disgusted reader of the quotations recently torn from one of his books. Furthermore, regardless of the literary verdict I could not subscribe under any circumstances to the personal attack that would lead to catastrophe in our intellectual activity if anyone carried it out. Culture is a strictly free phenomenon and I do not understand this senseless insult: "Another undesirable situation is created by indiscriminate composition of the publishing plans. To cite just one more example, Homer, Balzac and Cornel Ungureanu can come off the presses of the same publishing house at the same time. While the works of the first two are sold immediately, the last one's book attracts all the dust in the book stores as if by an irresistible magnetic force and lies there for years. A book by fanus Neagu has actually been published in a printing the same or even smaller than those of books by Bujor Nedelcovici, Maria Luiza Cristescu, Al. Papilian, Florin Mugur and others." Who gives this author the right to contrast Fanus Neagu with some talented and highly praiseworthy

colleagues of his? I favor a really practical and realistic policy for printings, but it is clear to me that none follows from Corneliu Vadim Tudor's article. Let me say once again that I am not bound by friendly feelings for those whom I defend. I do not talk to some, and others I do not even know. But I think it is reprehensible to carry on a cultural discussion in such a tone. What is so ridiculous about my defending both Homer and Cornel Ungureanu, who is a good critic as a matter of fact? But the attack is large scale: "Where he writes that Dan Culcer, Viorel Stirbu, Angela Marinescu, Valeria Boiculesei, Valeriu Cristea, Ileana Vrancea, Livius Ciocarlie, Dan Cristea, S. Damian, Dana Dumitriu, Elena Tacciu, Nicolae Prelipceanu, Petre Anghel and others should publish book after book and increase the liabilities of the publishing houses, when an honest opinion poll of the reading public would show that they are not read and interest only a very narrow circle of relatives and friends, to say nothing of the aesthetic and ideological criteria, which would have precluded the first appearances of many of those authors and others like them if they had been more strictly applied." Where does he write that? Exactly where he writes that C. V. Tudor has the right to express himself.

Aside from the fact that there are undoubtedly some noteworthy writers or scholars among those attacked, there is another problem. Who told Corneliu Vadim Tudor, who determined that this man, who publishes in the press, has the right to demand the exclusion of others from culture? The error reaches its most outrageous peaks. Having just arrived in this literary world with occasionally good poems (I say that because not even I would accept Corneliu Vadim Tudor's expulsion and what is more I have openly opposed the view of some that Tudor should be excluded from literature, although I think he is on a troublesome course), he demands no more nor less than an explanation of why Marin Sorescu's book "Vision of Vision" was published. I have nothing against criticism of Sorescu. I well know how unfair Sorescu himself can be and how lacking in the feeling of solidarity with the true worth the man has even if he sometimes wants to soil it himself. But I cannot support the idea that a great Romanian poet, Marin Sorescu, can be placed outside "the wholesome principles of Romanian culture, the national character, and beauty and morality in art." If the intransigent Corneliu Vadim Tudor would read Eugen Barbu's book "The Pit" with the same eyes with which he dives for pearls in Sorescu, would he have the courage to raise his eyes from the page? He finds the fact that the author speaks of rabbit dung very dangerous, very absurd and outside the national character. But go, boy, and read Eugen Barbu's book, a deathless masterpiece of Romanian literature as a matter of fact, and remember that hypocrisy is not good even in sleep. Intransigence has overcome C. V. Tudor! He who advanced himself by the flagrant theft of an article from a journal for internal use and published that article under his name! But I do not think there is no way back even from that. I think that even this man should be allowed to exercise his calling, such as it is, because I do not think it is right, or intellectual or socialist to demand the exclusion of anyone from literary activity. Some of the writers C. V. Tudor mentions may not mean a great deal to me either, but of what importance is that? We cannot determine others' lives. All we can be is surgeons in the matter of literary health, and certainly not butchers. How can you say those people should not have been published in the first place, you who do not know what is wrong with you? How can you quite calmly demand Marin Sorescu's expulsion from literature? Does anyone give you that right? Is that how you have read the history of this culture? That is to say Iorga, and I repeat the example, intervened with the sovereign to release Tudor

Arghezi from prison although he knew Arghezi would attack him again on the second day, while you intervene with public opinion and the publishing houses to do away with people you dislike. You can do this best in your library. You would not want to walk in jack boots in the national library, whoever you may be. In trying to defend our cultural policy some actually do it a disservice through voluntarism, intolerance and the attempt to deprive it of the diversity it so greatly needs.

The more values I see around me the better I feel, and I am happy to live at the time when the most good writers of Romanian literature are writing. "Good" may not be the most appropriate word because they are evil or malicious at times, but I think "the most good writers" is most accurate. I bar none, and there is room enough for all.* There is even room for a lesson in the acquired completeness of the values in Romania and in its literature. There is also room, so to speak, for Eugen Jebeleanu, Ion Lancranjan and M. Ungheanu, and for N. Manolescu, Eugen Barbu and Marin Sorescu. The moment anyone wants to kill a man he is becoming a suicide himself.

I want a Romanian culture by way of addition of values, for I feel that just as we lost many of our distinctive characteristics in the world by accepting the humiliating destruction of our statues, monuments and sanctuaries by others or by ourselves, Romanian culture can be a great world culture only in the entirety of its expressed genius, by way of Titus Popovici's books, wherein I have sometimes noted a predilection for Nicolae Breban, by way of the books of Nicolae Breban, who discharged me from ROMANIA LITERARA, by way of creating a unity in diversity and fulfilling the golden dream of the unity of Romanian letters around the supreme ideal of service to man, the people, intellectual dignity, the nation, and the world's good.

I want "The Complete Works of the Romanian People!" Am I asking too much?

SAPTAMINA Responds to Attack

Bucharest SAPTAMINA in Romanian 2 Jul 82 pp 3, 7

[Article by Corneliu Vadim Tudor]

[Text] At all times and in all cultures, a national literature has been made primarily by great and lasting works. They have been created by authors of genius, but after their deaths those authors can be honored and interpreted only in the light of their works. Thus Homer does not exist without the Iliad and the Odyssey, nor Dante without the Divine Comedy. It is paradoxical that a great novel like Don Quixote should rival its parent, Cervantes, in fame, so that quite a few foreign and even Spanish aestheticians have wondered whether the sad-faced cavalier may not be the father of the warrior of Lepanto metaphorically speaking instead of the reverse. I have set down these simple truths to remind some who seem to forget it that a creative mind cannot exist apart from its works and that there is a reciprocal determinism between them both. For example, we would harbor feelings of sympathy and compassion for Pantazi Ghica, because of his infirmity and the stories woven around his person, to no purpose if his work did not exist. It is even true that that modest scribe is preserved in literary history more because he is caught in the amber of Eminescian verses than for the writing

*There is even room for common sense.

he left. There have been and are some who have made and are making waves around their persons and huge, hastily polished cardboard pedestals, but that can mean only a certain popularity during their lifetimes and is no eternal sign of worth. From the standpoint of those and other truths I have written some articles in SĂPTĂMÎNA recently. I would not call them polemics because I did not intend them to be and I do not think they turned out to be anything of the kind. It was my right as a professional journalist and young writer with some books published and some plays performed to try to explain, in sight of the readers, certain mechanisms of the publishing houses' output and a number of undesirable situations that unfortunately still obtain in our contemporary literary world. I consider it the constitutional right of any citizen of the republic, whether he is a journalist, writer, or just a citizen, to express his opinion frankly in the press as to what he thinks is wrong with any field and not only literature. It is a right won by the labor of 150 years of the Romanian press and about 40 years of revolutionary socialist construction in Romania. Of course there is also room for contrary opinions. I could not say that that is true of the poet Adrian Paunescu's article "Value by Addition" in ROMANIA LIBERA for 9 June 1982. In keeping with an older custom, he enters into a literary discussion unprepared and with a violence that does not in the least intimidate me, posing as a mediator and defender in certain problems. Written in precisely the style I was combatting in the article "The Book Empire," his article would help to capture some new recruits for the cultural program which he is promoting with troublesome insistence but which, as far as I am concerned, succeeds only in convincing me that integrity is not to be found on all paths. From one end to the other, his stand justifies me in concluding that he has not entirely understood the purport of the books under discussion or of my procedure. What conclusion did he draw? Solely that "I do not like this tone of annihilation, the attempt to destroy some writers' lives and careers and especially those of two of them, Norman Manea and Marin Sorescu." Where in my entire article did he see what he calls further on "attempted murder"? How can he play upon the words of the Romanian language in such a serious way? Who demanded the finish of these people's lives? I merely wrote that Norman Manea's "October Eight O'Clock" /Octombrie ora opt/ and Marin Sorescu's "Vision of Vision" are "the two latest extremely strange publications" giving specific examples and concluding, "Of course there can be no question of art here. Who needs such books?" Accordingly it was a question of books and not of authors! It is unfortunate that our journalist went beyond a discussion of principles and resorted to insulting personal attacks, and that too in a political daily printed in several hundred thousand copies! You cannot plead for a cultural cause in a pamphlet, however boorish and vitriolic it may be. Certain noble ideas (with which I naturally agree!) are expressed to no purpose because they are dragged into the discussion and cannot excuse but even aggravate the aggressive mediocrity of both books by contrast. And if I also speak of those principles I should say that militating for the unity of the writers front, civilized relations and mutual respect among all servants of the art of writing is a major commandment of our socialist culture that we all know. But no dialogue is possible in the way A. P. polemicalizes. For example I maintained that a shortage policy of publications and printings is in effect and that poor books are sometimes promoted, while my interlocutor asks me just what in my previous experience entitles me to bring up such problems. Then he advances irrelevant sophistries, whereupon he invokes the well-known adage about the neighbor's goat that I would kill, etc. I did not find a single argument in A. P.'s whole article to give me pause or shake my conviction that the two books do no honor either to their authors or to the

Dacia and Albatross publishing houses respectively, which published them. Only that gives me pause. Unimaginable things happen in both books, and they contain so many suggestive, insidious and distorted statements that I wonder how, with no preliminary documentation, an article could have been written that does not breathe a word about the real problems of these books and makes black out of white and the reverse, in the diversionary manner of the one who shouts louder and pretends to be outraged! To give you a more definite idea, let us consider them systematically and analyze them together. The first one is a book of sketches (some of them autobiographical I suppose), some of which take place in the world of childhood and, I am inclined to believe, are meant for the youngest readers. A. P. accuses me of quoting some passages cursorily and incompletely. But how much should I have quoted to convince us that the book is no good? It is 270 pages long. Should I have reproduced all of them? The whole book is wretchedly written, automatic dictation abounds, and not even the author knows what he means at some points, where he has lost the epic thread and his characters have taken over. In the main sketch of the book, entitled "Robot Biography," the paragraphs are marked at the beginning of a line by the following technical indicators: 1a, 2a, 3a, 1b, 1c, 2b, 4a, 2c, 3b, 3c, 5a, 4c, 5c, 4b, 5b and 6. The author wanted to indicate that the action takes place on several levels so that it should be read in series, that is 1a with 2a, 3a, 4a etc. I even accepted this presumed offer, rereading the sketch in all possible ways and directions, numerical and alphabetical, with the same catastrophic result. The whole book is full of linguistic and situational garbage that even the paper cannot bear. A little girl is described in this way: "She was 6 years old but seemed to be three or 30. She did not show any sign of gonorrhea at 6 years and, if you can believe it, every kind of excema, cough and suppuration..." On page 38 the character (another child!) vomits like this: "I was retching in revolting waves, leaning against the bark of the tree... I was broken, alone and powerless and I rested against the rough trunk of the oak tree, next to the filth that had erupted from me and the stench of putrefaction and offal." Vomiting is done just as "aesthetically" (or it is mentioned) on pages 85, 91, 102, 185, 222, 234 and 263. The author also has profoundly "philosophical" thoughts: "You must be happy, it does not matter how. We have only a moment and then the bubble has burst." On the Romanian seashore, I repeat, there are "pools of dung, pardon me, madam, over the whole shore. I could go in the water only once... the weather was miserable that Saturday... realize what a soup you have swallowed" (That is no mere triviality) etc. Why is Adrian Paunescu defending such a book? Why does he tell me, with the apostrophe "Go, boy," to look for similar things in Eugen Barbu's "The Pit," a masterpiece of the Romanian novel translated into 13 languages and enjoying the 25th anniversary of its publication this very year (contaminated by association with Norman Manea's "writing")? Naturally I am not moved so much because I dislike the patronizing and superior tone in which I am berated but for the more serious reason that the fruit of Norman Manea's mind has nothing in common with "The Pit" or "Week of Lunatics," being a bad book that is immoral for the sake of immorality. A. P. takes the precaution to say, "Of course I do not equate Barbu and Manea," but that is an empty formula that is automatically cancelled because he depends throughout his whole argumentation on the former's books to explain and excuse that of the latter. Of course there are obscenities in Eugen Barbu's books too, as there are in those of Eminescu, Rebreanu and Arghezi as well, to say nothing of Ovid, Shakespeare or Zola. But they are masterpieces breathing value through every pore and not conglomerations of free amours, vomit, excrement, fecal matter, contraceptives, curettages, menstrual flows and indecent gossip

like N. Manea's book. It is one thing to write, like Shakespeare in Othello for example, that a couple making love are playing "the two-backed beast," and another thing for Manea to write his ineptitudes designed to capitalize on the repressions and bad taste of some. For another example, I do not understand why the book "Dima the Pupil from the Seventh" [Elevul Dima dintr-a saptea] underwent great changes in the edition of a few years ago while N. M.'s book (which contains, among other things, an improper liaison between a Pioneer and the school directress married to an officer and close to retirement, almost in Drumesc's style of 50 years ago!) could be published unrestricted and even found staunch supporters. But let us pretend we did not see what A. P. means and pass over these extra-aesthetic details. I did not intend to make a case out of Manea's book in my first article. I criticized only certain aspects that I am now inclined to ignore. But I cannot ignore the basic problems of this publication, which betray the faulty ideology of the work. Here are only a few examples of the way N. M. burlesques a number of contemporary Romanian realities through the mouths of his heroes. A CEC [Savings and Loan Bank] official's suggestion that the winners in the lotteries for savings passbooks as well as other kinds of lotteries (Loto, Pronosport and ADAS [State Insurance Administration]) "shall no longer be any chance citizens but selected from the deserving ones" is justified as follows: "That would provide a new lever to encourage efforts in production, agriculture and creative technical-scientific activity and to raise the qualitative standards in the present stage of the general revolution. It would also conform to the dialectical-materialist conception of the world and life and of the active role of the individual, who is not subject to fate but the master and creator of events." Thus the key ideas of our policy and the party documents are parroted word for word in order to maintain a joke! We also find that a heroine, Maria, had been tried before 1944 "for illegal aid to the pagan and parasitic foreign traitors who should be exterminated without mercy for the health, prosperity and purity of the people of the country of the faith," a dangerous statement implying that the Romanians behaved brutally toward the sons of other nationalities, who "should be exterminated without mercy"! The facts are distorted at every step, and the initial period of socialist construction in Romania as well as a number of permanent Marxist ideas become purely and simply puppets under N. M.'s pen: "No more than one year and yet an eternity more had passed when Comrade B. became prefect of the county and summoned his father to the great struggle, with us or against us, and convinced him of historical progress, the grave-digging role of capitalism, cannon fodder, added value, opium for the people, awaken you downtrodden of life and farewell to the black past and henceforth we shall all be free and equal forever, slave with slave let us unite, the sun the sun the sun...." And consider this defiance of the party's correct policy on religious sects in Romania, whose freedom is total in both theory and practice: "He passed by a closed synagogue, its door battered to splinters (...) He came to a church. The door was open, a light was burning and there was no one there. He waited, and the priest did not appear even after an hour, nor were the believers going out." The same kind of distortion also occurs in the question "Shall we fool the phantom boredom that stalks the world?," which is an incorrect paraphrase of the words at the beginning of the Manifesto of the Communist Party: "A phantom is stalking Europe" except that in the Marxist classics the "phantom" was communism while N. M. has changed communism to "boredom."

Let us pass on to the other book, Marin Sorescu's "Vision of Vision." I repeat that in this case too I did not attack the author but the book, and I venture

(Do I have permission?) to say again that it is worthless. Why will A. P. not admit that M. S. can also write poor books? It has happened to better men, like Rebreanu and Sadoveanu for example, and no one raised such a row! Has Marin Sorescu become a taboo author exempt from criticism? We know from the party documents that no one can be exempt from something of the kind, neither the poet Sorescu nor the poet Paunescu nor others. My article did not deplore the expression "rabbit dung" alone, as A. P. humorously contends, but many more and more serious ones. I particularly deplored the strange and morbid zoophilia practised by the characters: A Bear is married to a Heifer but also has a lover, the Vixen, in the "classic triangle" as the author says. Then all the characters are changed in turn into people, to animals again, and finally to people again, making love even under these equivocal conditions. Perhaps Sorescu intended to write a fable in prose and verse, but if any fable is to last it must have a moral and a morality (in addition to the author's talent, which went into something of an eclipse here!), and I confess that I found neither one. There are gratuitous insults and curses everywhere which, either in or out of context, convey a deplorable underworld impression. I do not wish to dwell further on them. I quoted some of them in the first article, and the rest are between the covers of the book. But I shall reproduce, for the first time, some of the poet Sorescu's "profound" ideas about politics in general, the revolution and our contemporary realities. The Rooster tells the others, by agreement with the Rabbit, that they will transform the excursion into an "hour of political education" because it is well "for you too to know what poetry thrives upon and where the hen lays eggs in the revolution..." In making a declaration of love to the Vixen, the bear states "With every beautiful woman we also love our country a little, do we not? And the more women and the more beautiful they are the more your love becomes at one with the people." Does A. Paunescu agree with this unique but so vulgar and defamatory definition of patriotism? In the same cynical, offhand tone he also tells us Rabbit found a Dacian woman's skeleton in his vineyard, dating from the third century B.C., which he profaned as follows: "With the skeleton on my back I went through half the city, from one laboratory to another, for various analyses. They gave her a Wassermann, sedimentation rate, urinalysis and frog test to see if she was pregnant and two or three more analyses that gave her much trouble, since you know how it is at polyclinics." The historical tradition that the Agathyrsi Dacians set their laws to music to memorize them better (about which Aristotle himself enthused in one of his books) is ridiculed by M. Sorescu as follows: "They made up songs in order to memorize them, and perhaps he saw crowds of Agathyrsi /Dacians/ digging in that vineyard and loudly chanting: Do not steal, tra-la-la, do not kill, tra-la-la, in the woods, tra-la-la, kill the caterpillars!" These statements are associated with the unfortunate sentence, "The village midwives are better and better, and the ancestors are ever better delivered. In a final comment M. S. states that the character The Child "comes very close to being a real child wonder of our time, being as young and childish as he is wonderful." Isn't this a pejorative tone? I quoted a series of verses in my previous article (not in fragments as A. P. maintains but even in whole strophes). I reply with others equally full of sinister obsessions. Here is a whole poem this time: "Existentialei Mita/ I-a rupt traznetul rochita./ Cum facu, cum nu facu/ Ca-n furou ramase tul/ Asta li mari-ndoiala/ Mitei existentiala/ Acest fapt incoerent/ Azvirlind-o-n transcendent" /? / -- clearly a paraphrase of the dull and vulgar doggerel "Madam Mita the Cyclist." Here is another poem quoted entire: "Sachelarie, Macarie and Ilarie/ Each one had a caries/ They loaded them on a streetcar/ And they drank them with a straw/ Sachelarie thought

Macarie/ Had another caries/ 'Macarie, oh Carie, Magarie/ Bring out the other caries.'" Why are we so critical of the bad verses of some lyricists for light music, as A. Paunescu repeatedly has been, when we overlook or rather praise some equally halting products to the skies? Why are we so intransigent in combatting the wave of pornography in western art when we overlook similar scenes in Sorescu's book (as it is reported in my first article, where a peasant invites his neighbor to go to bed with his wife on his wedding night because he is charitable)?

This is something of an X-ray of the two books. Adrian Paunescu usually agrees with them, and frankly I am not surprised. I should like to point out some quite meritorious aspects of his activity in promoting new music and poetry and the patriotic and revolutionary values. For all these and other militant efforts the poet has won an aura that no one can diminish and I do not intend to do so. Nevertheless he sometimes operates with some criteria of value that are so paradoxical that he can appall the most timorous. Didn't he call the anonymous Ion Zubascu an "exceptional poet" on TV a few weeks ago? Do you know what the noises were for which the poor man was literally crushed by that epithet, which suddenly propelled him into the galaxy of Arghezi, Goga, Bacovia, Blaga and the other exceptional poets? I memorized them to quote them: "No child is born / Without a ton of triton" and "We do not want bombs or rockets/ We want tickets for treatment"! In the same snide spirit didn't A. P. rhyme the sacred word Cluj a few years ago with rouge and scandalize so many Transylvanians? Probably now, according to the new name of the Transylvanian municipality, the match of the words Cluj-Napoca will be carioca or another insult. A. Paunescu poses as a defender of Romanian culture but we find in his books quite a few gaps and omissions indicating that the author has not quite mastered the material he is conveying. Some time ago even Al. Piru roared with laughter because A. P. attributed the Brandenburg /Concertos/ to Beethoven instead of Bach! There are also other errors found in just one book, "From Barca to Vienna and Back." The journal, which he wrote with the avowed intention of submitting it for the "Herder Prize," is a faithful expression of his "rich" reading. Somewhere he mentions the "Italian painter" L. David, who painted Napoleon at the age of "49 years," the year "in question in the picture" being 1801. All well and good, with a few little inaccuracies: L. David (1748-1825) was 52, not 49, when he crossed the Saint Bernard Massif. The crossing took place in 1800 before the Battle of Marengo and not in 1801, and the man was true-born French and no Italian at all. In connection with the Herder Prize, he also tells us that "Contemporaries also came to Vienna to enjoy the great generosity of Mr Herder and of those who administer his generosity." That mistake is no good even as a figure of speech, since "Mr Herder" (1744-1802) could not be "generous" in that sense because he did not establish the prize of the same name and did not know what would happen after his death. The award was due to the generosity of the West German industrialist Alfred Toepffer, who established the prize in 1964 to aid scholars and artists among the peoples who had to suffer from fascism, and he named it for the great philosopher and humanist Herder because the latter was his favorite in all German culture. And so A. P.'s statement in the book, "provided that once and only once I shall win the Herder Prize," about which he laughs as about a joke, "which would not be bad to get," was not fulfilled for a great many reasons. In speaking of the paintings of Brueghel the Elder (whose name he misspells 6 times in a row, namely Breugel!) in the Museum of History of Art, through which he passed like the Orient Express through Ciulnita Station, A. P. writes, "There are scenes that brilliantly anticipate Antonioni's 'Satiricon' (sic) and the poetry in Dumitru Popescu's latest

book." Two things are noteworthy: In the first place, I fail to see how the great Fleming's art could brilliantly anticipate D. Popescu, and secondly and most important the "Satyricon" is by Fellini and not Antonioni. Elsewhere, in speaking of the Dictate of Vienna he writes equally erroneously: "Does that fateful moment when Romania, surrounded on all sides, kept silent while the envoys of its government signed the partition actually count for nothing?" Does A. P. actually not know that just one envoy, M. Manoilescu, signed while Valeriu Pope categorically refused? Concerning the "flagrant theft" with which he reproaches me and which I do not admit, I should like to point out a number of harmless influences that can (and do) appear in the process of poetic and journalistic preparation. These verses were published by A. P. a few years ago and also disseminated on TV: "It is the time when for this country/ Like an abrupt accent of spring/ The sun rises at Bucharest." But the idea as well as the words are Ioan Slavici's, who wrote them in 1884 in the Sibiu daily TRIBUNA: "The sun rises for all Romanians at Bucharest." There are also influences from Eminescu: "Here Zeus sleeps on the bed of stone/ The dog of the earth will bark at its shadow /umbra i-o latra/" (A. Paunescu) compared with "In the saint's name/be still and hear how barks/ The dog of the earth/ Under the stone cross" (M. Eminescu). From George Bacovia: "Draw the bridge from the bank" (A. P.) compared with "For we have not drawn the bridge from the bank" (G. Bacovia). From Lucian Blaga: "The dew on the field is nothing but/ The sweat of the voievod who plows" (A. P.) compared with "For the dew is only the sweat of the nightingales/ Who tired singing all night" (L. B.). From Tudor Arghezi, from whose poem "Hide and Seek" he takes over the subject, the atmosphere and the parallelism between the children's game of hide and seek and death (See A. P.'s poem "Life"). From Nicolae Labis: "My son and my daughter/ But why do you look so?" (A. P.) compared with "Child, you were right then/ But why do you still look at me thus?" (N. L.) and many, many others. He is "inspired" even by the colleague of his generation, Ana Blandiana. She wrote in 1968, "My hair stirs lightly on my brow/ In the wind roused by the passage of time," while in 1980 A. P. wrote "And mother, I feel you stroking my hair/ When the wind of the era blows through it." And here is a "loan" from N. Iorga: "Cleaving the passions' wave/ He follows your path of labor/ And the stone thrown at you/ He regards as a pedestal," which became in A. P. (in the journal MAGAZIN, 1981) the aphorism "Many have built their houses of the stones that others threw at them. We agree that these may be coincidences or assimilations of influences, for which we admit there is also a "way back. In the last analysis it is not pursuit of a plagiarism (real or imaginary) that determines the truth about a writer or a national literature. What is important is what the writer does beyond these circulated motifs and these assimilations.

As for A. Paunescu, he does things that now make me understand why he comes now and defends two books with serious aesthetic defects and not only aesthetic ones. There are poets of at least equal merit like Ion Gheorghe, Nichita Stanescu and Ioan Alexandru who do not have such vast potentials for expression "even in sleep," although their great talent might entitle them to something of the kind. Or perhaps in invoking Iorga so much, A. P. thought to carry out this bitter strophe as he understands it: "Living in a century of advertising/ Poet, you need /trebuie sa-ti cei/ / The brazen fellow fame, if you wish/ The world to know your name." There is no other way to explain the belligerent tone of this talented poet who, unfortunately has exchanged his lyre lately for another instrument, confusing poetry with the lengthy texts of folk music, or his habit of giving everyone conduct marks, telling us where to stand and where to eat at the

table, etc. I suggest that he explain to us just how his house in Barca came to be on picture postcards of Dolj County while some houses in which Eminescu, Caragiale and Calinescu are in complete anonymity. He tells us, "There is even room for common sense." That is the most viable statement in A. P.'s article and I do not believe he considered its boomerang effect when he wrote it, for association of his proposal of "The Complete Works of the Romanian People" with discussion of these last two books of Norman Manea and Marin Sorescu does not qualify as common sense. Can these two unworthy products in which the confusion /mistoul of history is professed be included in the glorious series that begins with Ovid's poems and continues with the works of Neagoe Basarab, Olahus, Cantemir, Eminescu, Hasdeu, Maiorescu, Goga, Parvan, Arghezi, Calinescu, Blaga et al.? We are also in favor of value, why not, but not by addition in any way or by chance but by discrimination! In conclusion I will quote some beautiful passages from the editorial in SCINTEIA TINERETULUI for Tuesday 8 June 1982: "Because, being a revolutionary and a communist is not a contract that you annul at the first difficulty or the first obstacle or a contract that you keep as long as you benefit in full from it. To be a revolutionary and a communist means an option for life, an option you cannot give up under the influence of the appearances of the moment. It is like boarding a train that passes through a tunnel. You cannot leap from it without risking your life. The capacity as a communist and revolutionary is therefore tested in times of difficulty, and it is tested in consistency toward the revolutionary ideals. But even further, it can be said that the true communist is verified in the face of those tests. You cannot be a communist and a revolutionary when all is well and going well for you and then, when real or most often imagined difficulties arise that pertain to petty pride or attitudes determined by petty interests, you waver, complain and react irrationally (...) Such consistency and stability in political options are especially necessary on the part of those who are active in training the new man, a field wherein any hesitation or any deviation from the revolutionary principles can have irreparable effects, particularly when it is a question of people working with youths and of actions and demonstrations dedicated to youths (...) In this way the life and activity of youth's clubs, cultural homes and literary circles must acquire a new spirit in the direction of truly revolutionary education of the spectators, so that the demonstrations of those on the stage as well as those in the hall will promote revolutionary militance, committed art, and modesty. That is the only way the nation and the revolution are truly served by art!"

5186

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ELECTION RESULTS IN REPUBLICS, PROVINCES DISCUSSED

Zagreb DANAS in Serbo-Croatian 8 Jun 82 pp 13-15

[Article by Gojko Marinkovic]

[Text] Why did well-known leaders fare worse in general in elections at recent party congresses and conferences? Did mistakes in their work contribute to it, or was it a reflection of no confidence?

When Yugoslav newspapers began to publish the results of the voting at party congresses and conferences, one could hear the opinion that they were only feeding the marketplace, and that it made no sense since in any case all the candidates would be elected, and thus all those numbers meant nothing or very close to nothing. The adherents of such views pointed out that it is perfectly understandable that those who are well known most often get fewer votes, for he who works makes mistakes, the person who is performing a function takes the risk of offending someone, not pleasing someone or stepping on their corns. For the common members of central committees or other forums, votes are cast mechanically, they have carte blanche because no one knows anything about them.

There are large bits of truth in such explanations, but it seems that they are still too simple to ring absolutely true. This year's voting for six republic congresses and two LCY conferences provides material for more complete analyses and a much broader consideration of the voting phenomenon, primarily because they cannot be so readily forced into a mold, with the leaders getting the fewest votes and the unknown getting the most. True, that was the rule to some extent, but there were significant exceptions.

But let us begin in the proper order. Of 772 delegates to the Slovenian LC Congress, all voted for seven members of the new central committee. There were no great differences in the number of votes received, but in any case Milan Meden got the fewest with 733, followed by 757 for Stefan Korosec, 755 for Valerija Skrebec, 757 for Roman Orgin, 759 for Franc Sali and 759 for Franc Setinc. Among members of the LCY Central Committee from Slovenia, the worst record was Roman Albreht's 732 votes, followed by Andrej Berbic with 753 and Anton Vratusa with 757.

At the Vojvodina Conference, there also were no great differences in the votes received, but nonetheless, of the 526 delegates, 23 decided not to vote for Bogdan Tankosic, 22 did not vote for Vasilija Silic, Stevana Sogorov or Slavko Veselinov, 20 did not vote for Predrag Vladislavljevic or Ivan Vracaric, 19 for Milovan Sogorov or Dusan Uzelac, Mirjana Zavrsek's name was not circled on 18 ballots and there were 17 votes less than the possible total for Janos Takaric, Miklos Vajda, Silvard Varosi and Vidosava Vujkovic. Among those getting fewer votes there are both prominent and unknown figures. To present some other names: Gizela Varga, Bosko Krunic, Katalin Hajnal, Stipan Kopilovic, Mihalj Bognar, Milan Mali, Branka Lazic, Vasa Milic, Istvan Sarosi, Dusan Popovic, Sreta Spajic. In voting for members of the LCY Central Committee, Dusan Popovic received the fewest votes with 510, while Dusan Alimpic got 512; that is not so few when we know that there 521 valid ballots.

Exceptions and the Rule

At the Montenegrin LC Congress, the difference between the highest and lowest total votes (18 of a possible 360) was slight, with Vojin Dakovic and Omer Kurjepovic getting the lower total. It is interesting that in the voting members of the LCY Central Committee, a well-known official got the most votes, with Vidoje Zarkovic receiving 365, and the least votes (350) were received by Stanka Glomazic-Lekovic.

No one received the maximum 417 votes at the Kosovo party conference either, with the best showing being for Ilijaz Kurteshi and Rahman Dedai (411 votes). The fewest votes were cast for Branko Skemberovic (396), Hajredin Hohxa (399), Sejjedin Batalli (386), Sretko Trifunovic (399), Slavko Stankovic (398), Tahir Ajazi (398), Tun Gojani (399), Vuk Saljic (398) and Vukasin Jokanovic (385). In voting for the LCY Central Committee, Ilijaz Kurteshi again received the most votes at 409, followed by Kole Shiroka at 408, with the least received by Danilo Vakic at 381, Azem Vllasi at 394, Ali Shukrija at 392, Bogoljub Nedeljkovic at 390 and Ilija Vakic at 398.

The thesis that the leaders receive the fewest votes could not be defended on the basis of votes at the Macedonian LC Congress, where Blaze Koneski, Ivan Avramovski and Lazar Mojsov received just two votes less than the maximum, and Aleksandar Grlickov received four less than the maximum. The composition of those who were most often left out is quite broad. Of the possible 868 votes, the least went to Kostadin Avremcev with 846, Rexhep Alili with 841, Mustafa Amitov with 838, Svetlana Antonovska with 836, Firuz Demir, 838, Vaska Duganova, 849, Azem Zulfikari, 846, Murtez Jajaga, 845, Fuad Jashari, 847, Redzo Muslioski, 848, Azbi Mustafin, 846, Femi Muca, 850, Idriz Ramadani, 848, Bosko Stankovski, 845, Jovan Stojanoski, 841, Aleksandar Stojanovski, 841, Spiro Stojcevski, 841 and Milan Horvat, 848. A similar result came in voting for the LCY Central Committee, for which 870 delegates voted. The fewest votes went to Stojan Stojcevski with 808, Dusan Veljkovic with 820, Hisen Ramadani with 823 and Boro Denkov with 819.

That which did not hold for Macedonia was true in Croatia, where as a rule those most often left off the ballots were the leaders. Among new members

of the Croatian LC Central Committee, the least votes went to Jure Bilic (1022), Branko Puharic (1028), Slavko Sajber (1028), Venceslav Kovacevic (028), Jelica Radojcevic (1029), Stipe Suvar (1036) and Marijan Kalanj (1039). It was similar in the voting for the LCY Central Committee, where of 1069 delegates 59 decided not to vote for Milutin Baltic, 49 did not vote for Jure Bilic, and Kamenko Markovic as a member of the LCY Statutory Commission received 43 votes less than possible. Among members of the republic central committee, the most votes were Slavko Cupac's 1067, while Rudolf Matosevic received 1062 for the LCY Central Committee.

Data for Thought

The voting was also very interesting at the Bosnia and Hercegovina LC Congress, where fully 25 members of the central committee received all 975 votes, and all of them were more or less unknown. Among members of the new LCY Central Committee there were four such, including Nikola Stojanovic.

At this congress there was at least difference between the highest and lowest vote totals, just nine, the number of times Ante Budimir's name was not circled.

All of these data give quite a bit of food for thought and consideration, but the theme of how the delegates voted came up just after the Ninth Serbian LC Congress, where for the first time it was noticed that one of the candidates received fully 153 votes less than the possible total. That was the number of delegates that did not circle Spire Galovic's name; he is the former secretary of the Serbian LC presidium. Yet some other prominent officials of this republic did not fare any better. Of the possible 1347 votes, Momcilo Baljak received 54 less, Ratko Burtulija 74 less, Milan Vukos, 51 less, Dragan Markovic 50 less, Dusan Ckrebic 104 less, Branko Pesic 49 less, Zika Radojlovic 52 less, Petar Kostic 41 less, Radovan Pantovic 49 less, Zivan Valiljevic 68 less, Dobrivoje Vidic 98 less, Tihomir Vlaskalic 106, Ivan Stambolic 126, Dusan Gligorijevic 111, Milojko Drulovic 53, Ljubisa Igic 57, Milos Minic 94, Dragoslav Markovic 123 and Peter Stambolic 106 less than the maximum.

A feature of the voting at this congress was that no one received all the votes, and about 100 candidates received from 20 to 30 votes less than the possible total.

In the break during the congress, we spoke with Dr Alekdandar Grlickov, whose commentary was brief: "This is nothing tragic, for why shouldn't there be a difference in the number of votes, and indeed, why shouldn't someone fail to be elected, that is democracy."

Open Ballots

We acquainted Mika Spiljak, a member of the Croatian LC Central Committee, with some of this data recently. He believes that it is hard to give a general evaluation, because we have to know all the situations. It is hard to reduce all the data to a single formula, for every republic has its

specific features and more data is necessary for a proper evaluation. But in one thing, Spiljak was decisive: "These results of the voting show that we should go to the elections with open ballots. I had suggested that, but the majority did not agree and the proposal was not approved." We can recall those initiatives by Spiljak, but we also remember the debate that took place on this issue at an LCY Central Committee session. Yet despite the fact that comrade Tito spoke about this at the 11th LCY Congress, for now things remain as they were, the number to be elected is the number of candidates. The advocates of retaining the old ways assert that open ballots would bring many problems, but the only argument they can present is one of structure, for what would happen if the requisite number of workers, women and young people were not elected, and then we must also take the nationality structure into account. What would happen, for instance, if one less Serb were elected than the structure required, or one less worker? This is the basic concern of the advocates of closed ballots. The problem as a whole is not inconsequential, but it is still a technical question.

We wanted to discuss these matters with someone who received the least number of votes at their congress, but we were politely rejected, so that nothing remained but to turn to the experts for opinions.

Dr Vladimir Goati, from the Belgrade Institute for Social Sciences, agreed to comment on these data. We asked him how many elections can be of interest for analyzing the status and relationships in the LCY, what he thought about the fact that better-known leaders generally received the least votes, how he regarded the fact that in Bosnia and Hercegovina the difference between the highest and lowest totals was but nine votes, while in other republics it was greater, reaching 143 in Serbia. We also wanted to know whether one of the reasons for the fact that well-known leaders fared worse was that those who work make mistakes and receive criticism, or was it perhaps closer to the truth to say that this is a reflection of lack of confidence and the stand that "we have had enough?"

[Dr Goati] Elections in the League of Communists, like elections elsewhere, are not a purely technical procedure by which an individual executes his responsibility. Rather, they are the fruit of political action and thinking. The facts that the delegates at congresses and conferences gave varying support to the candidates proposed and that those results were published in public information media are signs of democratization. I imagine that at previous congresses and conferences all the candidates did not receive all the votes, but the broad public was not informed about that. Data on the number of votes received by candidates for party functions are not made public, at least as a regular procedure, in the countries of "realistic socialism."

Differences in attitudes about candidates at recent party gatherings give witness to the conviction of delegates that they affect the election results by their decisions, that they have confidence in the election procedure. That is certainly significant, for internal democracy in the LCY, and democracy in general, cannot exist without procedures, without the "rules of the game." Although democracy is not limited to it, the differences in the

number of votes received by candidates at the recent LCY party gatherings, in percentage terms, are not great, for candidates did receive between 88 and 99 percent of the votes. According to that, even the candidates who received the worst results (and got 153 votes less than possible) still received a vote of confidence, for they received the votes of the great majority of delegates. But since we are talking about closed ballots, we can suppose that behind a negative vote there is a firm stand, the stand of a delegate, and not some accidental, momentary attitude. Thus that phenomenon is not insignificant, we should not pass it over in silence. Nor should we make a sensation out of it. We should, in fact, get used to the idea that elections mean the possibility that some candidate will not be elected at all, that he will not receive a majority, for that is democracy.

Without that "uncertainty," elections are transformed into appointment, and internal democracy becomes a metaphor without real content.

When we analyze the results of the elections at the recent LCY party gatherings in more detail, it is clear that individuals in prominent political positions, some, not all, received markedly fewer votes than other, less known candidates. A factor that certainly affected that is the circumstances that people in responsible positions necessarily offend some people, for politics in action consists of solving problems. Instead of general phrases and fancy words that captivate the minds and hearts of all, a politician must concretely come out with stands concerning individual and group interests, affirming some and rejecting others. Thus it is difficult to count on everyone's approval.

Besides the fact that people in prominent political positions cannot count on general support all the time, there are certain other factors that are important for explaining the observed differences in voting. The first is long tenure in political functions (not just in the LCY but also in other institutions), in a time when at the ideological and programmatic level we are loudly insisting on deprofessionalization, on collective work and a one-year mandate. The other factor perhaps is even more crucial. I refer to our unsatisfactory social situation right now, with such parameters as the decline in the real standard of living, great foreign indebtedness, high inflation, a worrisome level of unemployment, particularly among young people, etc. That situation cannot remain without effects in the League of Communists, particularly on its administrative agencies. Although the LCY is not the governing force, it is the most influential organization in our society. Since without the LCY it is impossible to explain the "starred moments" of this society, its historical accomplishments, in the same way we cannot explain the current critical situation without taking the role of the LCY into consideration. That is how the situation was characterized at the conference of Yugoslav sociologists last month in Ljubljana. It seems to me, and here I am hypothesizing, that in voting for people who carry out prominent party functions there emerged from various angles a certain dissatisfaction with the existing weaknesses and difficulties that we have in our society, and probably also the wish that we might emerge from those weaknesses and difficulties as soon as possible.

Yet if we take into account all the indicated factors and explanations, we will perceive that individuals in prominent places (not only in various locales but in the same locale) were accepted to varying degrees. The explanation for that is found in a whole combination of factors whose relative significance is difficult to determine without research. The images that the public has about an individual and his capabilities are not always founded on accurate information but on "this was said and that was seen" (which does not make the image less effective). We need to know the actual personal characteristics of the individual, his personal and political history.

The hypothetical explanation I have given does not even pretend to answer the question of the differences between votes received at the Bosnia and Hercegovina LC Congress, where there was a spread of 9 votes, and in Serbia, or in any of the other republic or province organization.

To merely suggest an answer to that question, it would be worthwhile to consider not only those who were elected but those who voted. Here I am thinking of the socioprofessional and other characteristics of the delegates to congresses and conferences, the degree of democracy in their selection, etc. On top of that, we must keep in mind the features of every organization (the number of members, the number of organizational levels such as the existence of regional organizations within republics), the type and magnitude of the problems the organization has confronted in the past period, etc.

[DANAS] Instead of a conclusion, let us state that closed ballots nevertheless permit voting, even if it is without consequences, but these trends show that the time is not far away when someone will be defeated even on those ballots. That was shown by this year's delegate elections, when even the same number of candidates (as positions) was no guarantee that everyone would be elected.

12131
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DISSENTING VIEWS HEARD AT DISCUSSION ON FEDERALISM, SELF-MANAGEMENT

Zagreb DANAS in Serbo-Croatian 22 Jun 82 pp 42-43

[Article by Momcilo Djorgovic: "Those Who Are Bothered by Federalism"]

[Text] "We now have a lot of shouting going on about federalism. Cursing etatism and republicanism is useless. It should be concretely and seriously studied, rather than cursed, so that ways can be found to eliminate it. I would curse them, because I do not like having five people in my republic make the decisions about everything, from the economy and politics to culture; but cursing is not productive." This is approximately what was said by Dusan Bilandzic (of the Faculty of Political Sciences in Zagreb) in an attack of confidential truthfulness at a round table in Belgrade, which was organized by the Marxist Center of the Central Committee of the Serbian LC, on precisely the same day and at the same time as when the Yugoslav team made its first lukewarm appearance at the World Cup. The subject of the round table was "federalism, autonomy, and self-management," and was thus both broad enough to start a discussion of the entirety of our political and economic life, and narrow enough to concentrate on our most recent current difficulties and problems.

A small group of political scientists, jurists, historians, and economists very quickly got into a heated discussion, with sharp criticism of the erection of political and economic barriers, the "ruling circles" and their territorial sovereignties, disintegration, etatism, and nationalism. Such questions as the following were also raised: are we a federation of states or a Yugoslav state of peoples, and have we come to replace the concept of "Yugoslavia and its republics" with the concept of "the republics within their Yugoslavia"? Also, how is it that a national identity has been assumed by the republics and provinces, as if the republics and provinces were national creations and not political ones? This talk was thus one with the cards on the table, one that was frank to a point that could not be suppressed, with positions stated that were sometimes far from being public [opinion].

The theses of Vojislav Seselj: The trends toward a disintegration of society--etatism, nationalism, autarchy, and the stagnation of self-management, are obvious to Miliivoje Trklja (of the Law Faculty of Novi Sad), as well as the economic difficulties with the structural crisis. The basic prerequisites for the development of self-management have not been secured.

According to Trklja, self-management without a material basis is just "self-management" with a chance of etatism. It is precisely in this relationship between so-called self-management and etatism that Trklja sees the reasons for all of the problems we have encountered. Under self-management, we are nowadays tolerating spontaneity in behavior, irrationality in investments, and rashly undertaken indebtedness abroad--for the most part, all merely for the sake of momentary interests. Such anarchy in the base favors a state that plays the role of a fireman. The more anarchy there is, the more etatism there is, and the more that the sociopolitical community intervenes, the more voluntarism there is at the base. Trklja is convinced that etatism is fueled by nationalism, because work, responsibility, enthusiasm, and involvement are not important to it, but rather who is of what nationality. As Trklja picturesquely put it, nationalism views a respectable Albanian as an Illyrian who must be driving the Serbs out of Kosovo, rather than as a person who is inclined toward cooperation.

As time passed, the criticisms voiced at the roundtable increased, and a dramatic culmination occurred in the discussions by Vojislav Seselj (of the Law Faculty of Sarajevo) and Slobodan Inic (of the National Defense Faculty in Belgrade). Seselj proposed a re-examination of some of the constitutional arrangements concerning the position of the republics and provinces under the 1971 constitutional amendments and the 1974 Constitution, because, according to Seselj, they had contributed substantially to the difficulties in the functioning of the federation. He pointed out that the 1974 Constitution attributes fundamental sovereignty to the federal units, so that one receives the impression that they are the ones who decided to join the federation, as if they had not been part of Yugoslavia even before the war. He then mentioned that the Leninist concept of a federation is a way to bring nations closer together and unite them, not a way to separate them.

Seselj warned against an escalation of parochial interests of the republican and provincial ruling circles, which are masked as universal interests. This frequently takes on such dimensions that obstruction of federal institutions occurs. The way in which the ruling circles speak on behalf of "their" peoples and nationalities also leads to ideological particularism, which then opens the door to ideologies foreign to Marxism. Seselj illustrated his position by pointing out that, let us say, no attempts are being made in Bosnia-Herzegovina to achieve a critical Marxist dissociation from the Pan-Islamism originating with Qadhafi and Khomeini.

A heated discussion was occasioned by Seselj's assertion that one cannot agree that Vojvodina and Kosovo joined Serbia in 1945, since they were part of Serbia even before that (Kosovo from 1912 and Vojvodina from 1918). Hajredin Hoxha, on the contrary, asserted that Serbia captured and annexed Kosovo in 1912, and that the Albanian people were subjected to repression by the Serbian bourgeoisie. Next, Hoxha claimed that one cannot speak of a pre-war Yugoslavia at all, since it was actually created during World War II, while the 1974 Constitution is substantially a realization of the decisions made by AVNOJ [Antifascist Council for the National Liberation of Yugoslavia]. By taking such a position, Hajredin Hoxha also opposed Slobodan Inic, who claimed that one cannot agree that Yugoslavia emerged through the party, nor

that it will disappear through LC federations. Yugoslavia is the work of the age-old aspirations of the southern Slavs for unification and a community, according to Inic: the party then supported these aspirations, for the most part, through its program.

The issue of the provinces: Hajredin Hoxha remarked that it is multinationalism that is providing the impetus for democracy, and he also recalled Kardelj's words that national romanticism plays a positive role in the development of a people until it is transformed into nationalism. He also stated his confidence that the greatest scope for humanism will be achieved only if all nationalities are fully equal with the other peoples in Yugoslavia.

Koca Joncic, Svetislav Radovanovic, and Milivoje Vujadinovic (from Novi Sad) did not agree with Seselj's positions. Svetislav Radovanovic, from the Vojvodina Assembly, pointed out that the annexation of Vojvodina to the Kingdom of Serbia in 1918 was actually a unitaristic and centralistic action. Thus, according to Radovanovic, one cannot agree that sovereignty is a "clearly etatist-republican category," because state sovereignty is an instrument for establishing the governing role of the working class, and not for the formation of alienated centers of power. Milivoje Vujadinovic, the chairman of the Vojvodina Constitutional Court, recalled that Vojvodina's autonomy was created during World War II, and that Vojvodina has been a constituent element of the federation since the creation of the new Yugoslavia. After his explanation of the legal and political system in the province, some of those present asked him whether his explanation meant that the province was only a province in form and was actually a republic, since it has all of the bodies and all of the authority of a republic. Vujadinovic answered that he was only describing matters as they stood, and that he would leave it up to others to decide whether this was the same thing as a republic or not.

Slobodan Inic took the liberty of calling our present stage a "refeudalization," the characteristics of which are as follows: the way in which the sovereignty of the republics and provinces has become absolute, in spite of the trends of the modern economy; the neglect of the market; the nondialectical concept of balanced development (everyone has to get everything); and the insistence upon national economies. According to Inic, there are two possible consequences of this state of affairs: either retardation in the development economic sense, leading to a suppression of self-management, or a qualitative development of an economic society that is a self-managing and democratic one; the latter requires a definitive resolution of the relations between economics and politics, the state and self-management, and the state and the party.

Inic warned that in Yugoslavia centralization is viewed exclusively in political terms, and not in developmental economic terms. Thus, there have been serious difficulties in the economic functioning of the federation. "All of the federal units only need Yugoslavia in order to pay their bills." Inic went even further and asserted that as a result of polycentric etatism we also have a multiparty system within one ideology and one party.

Dusan Bilandzic and Zivojin Radocevic (of the Faculty of Political Sciences in Belgrade) advocated the establishment of commodity production and of the economic integration of Yugoslavia. Zivojin Radocevic's observation was that only ultra-etatism masked as self-management (from the commune to the federal level) criticizes commodity production as neocapitalism.

Many issues were designated at the round table, and the emotions occasionally obscured scientific objectivity, but it could also be said that there was too much pessimism in some of the statements. A more comprehensive scientific development of all of these burning issues will probably take place before the fall, when the Marxist Center of the Serbian LC intends to organize another scientific meeting on this subject.

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